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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effects of female labor supply on the wage structure. To identify
variation in female labor supply, we exploit the military mobilization for World War II, which drew many
women into the workforce as males exited civilian employment. The extent of mobilization was not
uniform across states, however, with the fraction of eligible males serving ranging from 41 to 54 percent.
We find that in states with greater mobilization of men, women worked substantially more after the War
and in 1950, though not in 1940. We interpret these differentials as labor supply shifts induced by the
War. We find that increases in female labor supply lower female wages, lower male wages, and increase
the college premium and male wage inequality generally. Our findings indicate that at mid-century,
women were closer substitutes to high school graduate and relatively low-skill males, but not to those
with the lowest skills.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1900, 82 percent of U.S. workers were male, and only 18 percent of women over the age of
15 participated in the labor force. As is visible in Figure 1, this picture changed radically over
the course of the past century. In 2001, 47 percent of U.S. workers were women, and 61 percent
of women over the age of 15 were in the labor force. Despite these epochal changes in women’s
labor force participation, economists currently know relatively little about how female labor
force participation aﬀects the labor market.
• Does it increase or decrease male wages?
• Does it adversely aﬀect female wages?
• Does it impact male wage inequality?
The relative scarcity of convincing studies on this topic reﬂects the complexity of the phe-
nomenon: increased labor participation of women is driven both by supply and demand factors.
Women participate in the labor force more today than 100 years ago for a myriad of supply-
side reasons including changes in tastes, gender roles and technology of household production.
But women also participate more because there is greater demand for their labor services. To
advance our understanding of how rising female labor force participation impacts the labor
market, we require a source of “exogenous” variation in female labor supply.
In this paper, we study female labor force participation before and after World War II
(WWII) as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in female labor supply. As evocatively
captured by the image of Rosie the Riveter, the War drew many women into the labor force as
16 million men mobilized to serve in the armed forces, with over 73 percent leaving for overseas.
As is depicted in Figure 2, only 28 percent of U.S. women over the age of 15p a r t i c i p a t e di n
1the labor force in 1940. By 1945 this ﬁgure exceeded 34 percent.1 Although, as documented by
Goldin (1991), more than half of the women drawn into the labor force by the War left again
by the end of the decade, a substantial number also remained (see also Clark and Summers,
1982). In fact, the decade of the 1940s saw the largest proportional rise in female labor force
participation during the 20th century.
Although this aggregate increase in female labor force participation is evident from Figures
1 and 2, it is not particularly useful for our purposes; the end of the War and other aggregate
factors make the early 1950s diﬃcult to compare to other decades. But, central to our research
strategy, the extent of mobilization for the War was not uniform across U.S. states. While
in some states, for example Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah, almost 55 percent of males
between the ages of 18 and 44 left the labor market to serve in the War, in other states, such
as Georgia, the Dakotas and the Carolinas, this number was between 40 and 45 percent. These
diﬀerences in mobilization rates reﬂect a variety of factors, including exemptions for farmers,
diﬀerences in age, ethnic and occupational structures, as well as idiosyncratic diﬀerences in the
behavior of local draft boards. We exploit diﬀerences in state WWII mobilization rates, as
well as components of these mobilization rate diﬀerences that are plausibly exogenous to other
labor market outcomes, to study women’s labor supply.
Panels A and B of Figure 3 show that women worked substantially more in 1950–but not
in 1940–in states with greater mobilization of men during the War (see below for the exact
deﬁnition of the mobilization variable). Our baseline estimates suggest that women worked
on average about 1 week more in a state that had a 10 percentage point higher mobilization
rate during WWII, corresponding to a 9 percentage point increase in female labor supply. This
diﬀerence is not accounted for by diﬀerences in age structure, racial structure, education or
the importance of farming across these states, nor is it explained by diﬀerences in occupational
structure, regional trends in labor supply, or contrasts between Southern and non-Southern
states. We interpret these cross-state changes in female employment as caused by the greater
participation of women during the War years, some of whom stayed in the labor market after
the War ended. Notably, we ﬁnd in Panel C of Figure 3 that the sizable association between
WWII mobilization rates and growth in female labor supply over the 1940s did not recur in
the 1950s, lending support to the hypothesis that these shifts were caused by the War, and not
1For convenience, we refer to Census years as 1940, 1950, etc. In reality, Census data provides labor supply
information for the prior calendar year.
2by diﬀerential long-run trends in female employment.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows an equally strong relationship between female wage growth over
the 1940s and WWII mobilization rates: in states with greater mobilization for war, female
wages grew much less. Panel B shows a negative relationship for male wages as well, but the
slope of the relationship is considerably less steep.
We interpret the relationships shown in Figure 4 as the causal eﬀect of the WWII-induced
increase in female labor supply on female and male wages. As Figure 2 shows, the aggregate
demand shock that drew many women into the labor force during the mobilization years had
reversed itself by 1947. But women continued to work in greater numbers after 1947, presumably
because employment during the War changed their preferences, opportunities and information
about available work.
Our interpretation of the relationship between mobilization, female labor supply, and wage
growth faces two major challenges:
1. High- and low-mobilization states may be diﬀerent in other unobserved dimensions. In
that case, Figure 3 and 4 may be capturing the eﬀect of these unobserved characteristics
on labor market outcomes, and our identiﬁcation strategy may be assigning the eﬀects of
these unobserved state characteristics on labor market outcomes to female labor supply.
2. Mobilization of men for war may have had a direct eﬀect on the labor market, distinct from
its impact through female labor supply. For example, men who served in the War may
have had diﬃculty reintegrating into the workforce, or may have entered school instead
due to the opportunities oﬀered by the GI Bills (Bound and Turner, 1999; Stanley, 1999).
If this were the case, our ﬁrst-stage ﬁnding of a relationship between mobilization and
female labor supply would remain valid, but our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates
would be biased: greater female labor force participation in high-mobilization states could
reﬂect greater demand for female labor input rather than shifts in female labor supply.
Although we cannot dismiss these two interpretations entirely, we provide evidence to sug-
gest that they are not the primary source of our ﬁndings. Our results are typically robust to
including a variety of aggregate characteristics of states, including fraction of farmers before
the War, racial, education, and occupational structures. We also obtain similar results when we
focus on the component of mobilization rate generated by cross-state diﬀerences in aggregate
3age and ethnic structure, which were important determinants of state mobilization rates, but
should plausibly have no direct eﬀect on female labor supply growth once we condition on indi-
vidual age and ethnicity. These ﬁndings weigh against an interpretation along the lines of the
ﬁrst objection above. Moreover, female labor force participation did not vary systematically
between high- and low-mobilization states prior to the War, suggesting that these states were
initially broadly comparable along this dimension. Finally, as Panel C of Figure 3 documents,
high-mobilization states did not experience faster growth in female employment between 1950
and 1960. Hence, there do not appear to be diﬀerential state employment trends correlated
with WWII mobilization rates.
If, on the other hand, the second concern were important–that is, if returning veterans
had trouble reintegrating into the labor market–there should be lower labor force participa-
tion among men in 1950 in high-mobilization states. We ﬁnd that this is generally not the
case. Men who were not mobilized appear to participate slightly more after the War in high-
mobilization states. And post-war labor supply of WWII veterans in 1950 is, for the most part,
comparable across high and low-mobilization states, though some speciﬁcations do show nega-
tive but insigniﬁcant eﬀects. Furthermore, if greater female participation in 1950 were driven
by demand rather than supply factors, we would expect relatively greater wage growth for both
women and men in high-mobilization states. Instead, consistent with our interpretation, Figure
4 shows that both men and women earned relatively less in high-mobilization states in 1950
than in 1940. Nor are our results driven by cross-state wage convergence between agricultural
and industrialized states during the 1940s (e.g., Wright, 1986); in speciﬁcations that control
for lagged state wage measures, we continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of mobilization on the
structure of male and female earnings. Finally, Figure 5 shows no relationship between state
WWII mobilization rates and wage growth between 1950 and 1960. Hence, the cross-state
correlations that we exploit between WWII mobilization and female labor supply or relative
wage changes by gender appear unique to the WWII decade.
Exploiting the diﬀerential growth in female employment between 1940 and 1950 related to
cross-state diﬀerences in WWII mobilization, we estimate the impact of female employment on
a range of labor market outcomes. Our main ﬁndings are:
1. Greater female labor supply reduces female wages. A ten percent increase in relative
female labor supply (that is, relative to males) lowers female wages by 6 to 7 percent,
4implying a labor demand elasticity of -1.4 to -1.7.
2. Greater female labor supply also reduces male wages. A 10 percent increase in the (log)
ratio of female to male labor supply typically lowers male earnings by 3 to 5 percent.
3. The ﬁnding that female labor supply lowers women’s wages by more than men’s indicates
that male and female labor inputs are imperfect substitutes. We estimate that a 10 percent
increase in relative supply reduces relative female/male earnings by about 3 percentage
points. This implies a substitution elasticity of approximately 3, which is large but far
from perfect substitutability.
4. The impact of female labor supply on male earnings is not uniform throughout the male
earnings distribution. A 10 percent increase in female relative labor supply raises earnings
inequality between college and high school graduate males by about 1.5 percentage points
and lowers earnings inequality between high school graduate and eight-grade males by
about 2 percentage points. These ﬁndings indicate that the women drawn into the labor
market by the War were closer substitutes to males at the middle of the skill distribution
than those with either the lowest or highest education.
5. Although female labor supply has countervailing eﬀects on educational diﬀerentials, its
net impact on overall and residual earnings inequality among males is positive. A 10
percent increase in female labor supply is estimated to increase the male 90-10w e e k l y
earnings diﬀerential by 5.5 log points, which is a very sizable eﬀect.
It is important to note that these estimates conceptually correspond to short-run elasticities
since we are looking at equilibria in state labor markets shortly after the War, that is, shortly
after the changes in female labor supply. Migration, changes in interstate trade patterns and
changes in technologies could make the long-run relationship between labor market outcomes
and female labor supply quite diﬀerent from the short-run relationship. Results exploiting
changes between 1940 and 1960 suggest that long-run elasticities are indeed larger than short-
run elasticities.
The economics literatures on the eﬀect of WWII on female participation and the eﬀect of
female labor supply on the structure of wages contains a small number of well-known contribu-
tions. Goldin (1991) is most closely related to our work. She investigates the eﬀects of WWII
5on women’s labor force participation and ﬁnds that a little over half of the women who entered
the labor market during the War years exited by 1950. Our labor supply estimates appear
consistent with these ﬁndings, though diﬀerences in the sample frame make it diﬃcult to make
exact comparisons. Mulligan (1998) investigates the causes of the increase in labor supply
during the War, and concludes that non-pecuniary factors rather than market incentives drove
this growth. Neither Goldin nor Mulligan nor, to the best of our knowledge, any other author
investigates the relationship between cross-state mobilization rates and female labor supply,
nor the causal eﬀect of the induced change in female labor supply on labor market outcomes of
men.2
Blau and Kahn (1999), Juhn and Kim (1999), Topel (1994 and 1997) and the short papers
by Fortin and Lemieux (2000) and Welch (2000) also investigate the eﬀect of female employment
growth on male wage inequality.3 Using Current Population Survey data from 1968-1990, Topel
(1994) ﬁnds a strong positive correlation between regional changes in female labor supply and
growth in male earnings inequality. By contrast, Juhn and Kim (1999) do not ﬁnd a sizable
eﬀect of female labor supply on male wage inequality in a cross-state Census panel. Fortin
and Lemieux hypothesize that the increase in male wage inequality during the past several
decades may reﬂect the process of women substituting for males in the earnings distribution,
and provide time-series evidence on the correlations between percentiles of the male and female
wage distribution that are consistent with this hypothesis. Finally, Welch (2000) links both
the decline in the wages of low-skill men and the narrowing of the male-female wage gap over
the past three decades to the overall increase in the demand for skills. While each of these
analyses reaches provocative, albeit divergent, conclusions, the identiﬁcation strategies used do
not provide a means to separate supply- and demand-induced changes in female employment.
What distinguishes our analysis is the use of plausibly exogenous variation in female labor
market participation induced by World War II mobilization.
In the next section, we brieﬂy discuss the predictions of a simple competitive model regarding
the eﬀect of increased female labor force participation on male labor market outcomes. Section
2An unpublished dissertation by Dresser (1994) studies the relationship between federal war contracts and
labor market participation of women across metropolitan areas and ﬁnds that MSAs that had a relatively large
number of war contracts during the war experienced diﬀerential increases in female labor force participation
between 1940 and 1950.
3Goldin and Margo (1992) provide the seminal work on changes in the overall structure of earnings during
the decade of the War. For excellent syntheses of the state of knowledge of the role of women in the labor
force, see Goldin (1990 and 1994), Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002), Blau and Kahn (1994, 1997 and 2000),
and O’Neill and Polachek (1993).
63 describes our microdata and documents the correlation between female employment and a
range of female and male labor market outcomes. In Section 4, we provide a brief overview of
the draft and enlistment process for World War II, and explain the causes of the substantial
diﬀerences in mobilization rates across states. Section 5 documents the relationship between
WWII mobilization rates and female labor supply in 1950, and argues that mobilization rates
generate a plausible source of exogenous variation in female labor supply. Sections 6 and 7
contain our main results. They exploit cross-state diﬀerences in female labor supply induced
by mobilization rates to estimate the impact of increased female labor supply on female wages
and male wages, educational inequality, and overall earnings inequality among males. Section
8 concludes.
2 Some Simple Theoretical Ideas
To frame the key questions of this investigation, it is useful to brieﬂy discuss the theoreti-
cal implications of increased female labor force participation. Consider a competitive labor
market consisting of four factors: high-skill males, Ht, low-skill males, Lt,f e m a l e s ,Ft,a n d
capital, Kt, which stands for all nonlabor inputs.4 Imagine that all these factors are imper-
fectly substitutable in the production of a single ﬁnal good. In particular, to ﬁx ideas, consider
the following nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregate production function,






















where At is a neutral productivity term, and the Bt’s are factor-augmenting productivity terms,
w h i c ha r ef o rn o wt a k e na se x o g e n o u s . I np a r t i c u l a r ,BF
t is an index of female productivity,
which may reﬂect observed or unobserved components of female human capital as well as
technical change favoring women relative to men. This speciﬁcation assumes that the elasticity
of substitution between the labor aggregate and nonlabor inputs is equal to 1, the elasticity
of substitution between female labor and high-skill male labor is 1/(1 − ρ), and the elasticity
of substitution between low-skill male labor and the aggregate between female and high-skill
male labor is 1/(1 − η).W h e n η > ρ, female labor competes more with low-skill male labor
4We do not distinguish between high- and low-skill females both to reduce the number of factors and because,
in the empirical work, we will only have a source of exogneous variation in the total number (or total eﬃciency
units) of females in the labor force.
7than high-skill male labor, whereas when η < ρ, it competes more with high-skill male labor.
This nested CES is similar to the one used by Krusell et al. (2000) with high-skill and low-skill
labor, and equipment capital.
In this model, the wage ratio of high-skill to low-skill male wages, corresponding to the skill
or education premium, is a natural index of male wage inequality. Since in competitive labor
































= Signhη − ρi,
that is, an increase in eﬀective female labor supply increases male wage inequality when women
compete more with low-skill males than with high-skill males, i.e., when η > ρ.I f f e m a l e
labor has traditionally been a closer substitute to low-skill male labor than high-skill male
labor as argued by Grant and Hamermesh (1981)a n dT o p e l( 1994 and 1997) among others, we
may expect increased female labor force participation to act as a force towards greater wage
inequality among men. The empirical magnitude of this eﬀect is unclear, however.
The eﬀect of increased female labor force participation on average wages of men, or on the
level of high-skill and low-skill wages, depends upon the elasticity of supply of nonlabor inputs.
It is straightforward to verify that if these nonlabor inputs are supplied elastically (or if α =1 ),
increased female labor supply will always raise average male wages. If, on the other hand,
the supply of nonlabor inputs to the economy is upward sloping, the eﬀect is ambiguous, and
depends on the elasticity of substitution between male and female labor and on the response
of the rental price of these nonlabor inputs to the increase in female labor supply.




































= Signhα − ηi. (1)
8In other words, when the elasticity of substitution parameter, η,i ss u ﬃciently high relative
to the share of labor in production, α, an increase in female labor supply will reduce the
(conditional) demand for and the earnings of low-skill males. In what follows, we will loosely
refer to female and (a particular type of) male labor as “close substitutes” when greater female
employment reduces the wages of that type of male labor, since a greater level of η (i.e., a
greater elasticity of substitution) makes such negative wage eﬀects more likely.
T h es a m et r a d e - o ﬀs determine whether average male wages increase or decline in response
to increased female labor force participation. Substitution of female labor for male labor, by
reducing the ratio of nonlabor inputs to eﬀective labor, acts to depress earnings, while the
complementarity between female and male labor raises the earnings of men. The overall eﬀect
will be determined by which of these two forces is stronger.
Can we use this framework to interpret the relationship between female labor supply and
wages at the state level in the aftermath of WWII? There are at least three caveats that apply:
1. This interpretation requires U.S. states to approximate separate labor markets. This
may be problematic if either migration makes the entire U.S. a single labor market,
or if local labor markets are at the city or MSA level. Both problems would cause
attenuation, which does not bias instrumental-variables estimates, but makes them less
precise. For example, in the extreme case where migration is free and rapid, there would be
no systematic relative employment and factor price diﬀerences across state labor markets.
Many studies, however, ﬁnd migration to be less than perfect in the short run (e.g.,
Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Bound and Holzer, 2000, Card and DiNardo, 2000), while
others document signiﬁcant wage diﬀerences across state or city labor markets (e.g., Topel,
1994, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Moretti, 2000, Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2001,
Hanson and Slaughter, 2002, forthcoming).Our results also show substantial diﬀerences
in relative employment and wages across states related to WWII mobilization.
2. The single-good setup is an important simpliﬁcation. When there are multiple goods
with diﬀerent factor proportions, trade between diﬀerent labor markets can also serve
to equalize factor prices (Samuelson, 1948). It is reasonable to presume that changes in
interstate trade patterns required to achieve factor price equalization do not take place
9in the short run.5
3. Short-run and long-run elasticities may also vary signiﬁcantly, either because there are
factors, such as capital or entrepreneurial skills, that adjust only slowly (cf, the LeChater-
lier principle in Samuelson, 1947), or because technology (organization of production) is
endogenous and responds to the availability of factors (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002).
In light of all these caveats, the elasticities we estimate in this paper should be interpreted as
short-run elasticities (except when we look at the two-decade change between 1940 and 1960).
The majority of the estimates exploit the diﬀerential increase in female labor supply at the end
of the War on labor market outcomes shortly after the War. Migration, changes in interstate
trade patterns and changes in technologies are likely to make the long-run relationship between
female labor supply and labor market outcomes quite diﬀerent from the short-run relationship.
3 Data Sources and OLS Estimates
3.1 Data
Our basic data come from the one-percent Integrated Public Use Microsamples (IPUMS) of the
decennial Censuses. Samples include males and females ages 14-64 in the year for which earnings
are reported who are not residing in institutional groups quarters (such as prisons or barracks),
are not employed in farming, and who reside in the continental United States. Throughout the
paper, we exclude Alaska, Hawaii, Washington D.C. and Nevada from the analysis. Alaska and
Hawaii were not states until the 1950s, while Nevada underwent substantial population changes
during the critical period of our analysis.6 The 1950 sample is further limited to the sample-line
subsample because educational attainment is not reported in the full sample. Sampling weights
are employed in all calculations. Earnings samples include all full-time, full-year workers in paid
non-farm employment excluding self-employed who earned the equivalent of $0.50 to $250 an
hour in 1990 dollars during the previous year (deﬂated by CPI All Urban Consumers series
CUUR0000SA0). Weekly earnings are computed as total wage and salary income earned in the
previous year divided by weeks worked in the previous year, and hourly earnings are computed
as wage/salary income divided by weeks worked in the previous year and hours worked in the
5This is especially true at midcentury, since construction of the U.S. Interstate Highway System did not
begin until 1956 with the authorization of the Federal Aid-Highway Act.
6Nevada had an extremely high mobilization rate, yet despite this, lies directly along the regression line for
most of our analyses. Inclusion of Nevada aﬀects none of our results
10previous week.7 Top coded earnings values are imputed as 1.5 times the censored value. We
deﬁne full-time, full-year employment as working at least 35 hours in the survey week and 40
weeks in the previous year. Because weeks worked in 1940 are reported as full-time equivalent
weeks, we do not impose the hours restriction for the full-time 1940 sample and when making
hourly wage calculations, we count full-time equivalent weeks as 35 hours of labor input.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 1940, 1950 and 1960 Censuses, which are our
main samples. Statistics are given for all the 47 states in our sample, and also separately for
states with high, medium and low-mobilization rates, corresponding to below 45.4, between
45.4 and 49.0, and above 49.0 percent mobilization. This distinction will be useful below since
diﬀerences in mobilization rates will be our instrument for female labor supply. Details on the
construction of mobilization rates are given in Section 4.
As is visible in Table 1, high-mobilization states have higher average education, higher wage
levels, and slightly older populations than low-mobilization states in 1940. Farm employment
and nonwhite population shares are considerably lower in these states. However, female labor
supply, measured by average weeks worked per woman, does not diﬀer among high-, medium-
and low-mobilization states in 1940.
3.2 Female Employment and the Level and Distribution of Earnings
In this section, we document the cross-state correlations between female labor supply and their
range of labor market outcomes over the ﬁve decades between 1940-1990. Table 2 presents the
relationship between female employment and a variety of aggregate state labor market outcomes
including female and male wages, male earnings inequality, and the male college/high school
earnings diﬀerential. In all these models, our measure of female labor supply is average weeks
worked by female state residents aged 14 to 64 (with other sample restrictions as above).
In Panels A and B, we measure wages as log weekly earnings of full-time, full-year workers,
and control for year main eﬀects, state of residence and state or country of birth dummies, a full
set of education dummies, a quartic in (potential) experience, and dummies for nonwhite and
marital status. As in all wage models we report in this paper, all covariates other than the state
dummies are interacted with time to allow returns to education, experience and demographics
7The 1940 Census does not distinguish between wage/salary and self-employment income and hence both
sources are implicitly used in earnings calculations. Restricting the sample to non-farm employed likely sub-
stantially reduces the importance of self-employment income in the 1940 sample.
11to diﬀer by decade.8 The results show no consistent relationship between female employment
on the one hand and female earnings and male earnings on the other. For example, column 1,
which uses data from 1940 and 1990, indicates that greater female employment is associated
with an increase in female wages, and a slight decline in male wages. Other columns report
results for diﬀerent subsamples.
Panel C reports the relationship between female labor supply and the male college/high
school wage premium. To perform this calculation, we regressed log weekly full-time earnings
of males with exactly a college and those exactly a high school degree on year main eﬀects, state
of birth and state of residence dummies, and the same set of covariates and their interactions
with time, and the measure of average weeks worked by females in their state of residence. Each
variable (and the constant) is interacted with a college-graduate dummy and the coeﬃcient
reported is the interaction between the female labor supply measure and the college graduate
dummy. This coeﬃcient measures the relationship between female labor supply and the earnings
of college graduates relative to high school graduates (see equation (7) below). Panel C shows
a weak negative relationship between female labor supply and the male college/high school
wage diﬀerential: in the full sample and in 1970-90, a 1 week increase in female employment is
associated with a 1 percent decline in the college/high school diﬀerential.
Finally, Panel D reports results from regressions of within-state changes in overall male
earnings inequality on changes in female weeks worked. The measure of inequality used here
is the log diﬀerence between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the male earnings distribution.
The results show no relationship between overall male wage inequality and female labor supply
between 1940 and 1990 or between 1970 and 1990, but during earlier decades, there is a positive
association between female employment and male wage inequality, and this relationship is
signiﬁcant in the 1940s.
If the results in Table 2 corresponded to the causal eﬀect of female employment on female
and male wages, we would conclude the demand for female labor was highly elastic (eﬀectively
ﬂat), and that male and female workers were not particularly close substitutes.
These conclusions would be premature, however, since variations in female employment
reﬂect both supply and demand forces.9 To the extent that female labor supply responds
8Results without such interactions are similar, and are available upon request.
9An additional problem is composition bias: women who participated at the margin may have been diﬀerent
(say less productive) than the average woman, creating a spurious negative relationship between female em-
12elastically to labor demand, the OLS estimate of the eﬀect of female employment on female
wages will be biased upward by simultaneity; that is, female labor supply will be positively
correlated with the level of labor demand and hence positively correlated with wages. Similarly,
to the extent that demand for male and female labor move together, the OLS estimate of the
eﬀect of female employment on male wages will also be biased upward. On the other hand,
the OLS estimates of the eﬀect of female labor supply on male wage inequality may be biased
upward or downward depending on whether greater labor demand increases wages more at the
top or the bottom of the residual earnings distribution.
To obtain unbiased estimates of the eﬀect of female employment on these labor market
outcomes, we require a source of variation in female labor supply that is uncorrelated with
demand for female labor. In the next section, we explore whether variation in state mobilization
rates for WWII may serve as such a source of variation.
4 Mobilization for World War II
Following the outbreak of the War, the Selective Service Act, also known as the Burke-
Wadsworth Bill, was introduced in the Senate in June 1940 to correct ﬂawed conscription
policies from the World War I era. The Burke-Wadsworth Bill initiated a mandatory national
registration in October 1940 for a draft lottery for all males ages of 21- 3 5t og a t h e rr e l e v a n t
data on potential draftees. By the time the draft ended in 1947, there had been a total of six
separate registrations with the age range expanded to include 18-64 year olds. Only 18-44 year
olds were liable for military service, however, and many of these either enlisted or were drafted
for the War. Men aged 45-64 were registered as part of a civilian workforce management eﬀort
by the Selective Service.
Following each of the registrations, there were a series of lotteries determining the order
that a registrant would be called to active duty. Local draft boards then classiﬁed all of the
registrants into qualiﬁcation categories. The Selective Service’s guidance for deferred exemp-
tion was based on marital status, fatherhood, essential skills for civilian war production, and
temporary medical disabilities, but left considerable discretion to the local boards.
ployment and female wages. Our instrumental-variables estimates will also be subject to a variant of this bias:
IV estimates will identify the market eﬀects of the labor supply of women whose behavior is aﬀected by our
instrument; these women may diﬀer from the “average” female labor force participant (see Angrist and Imbens,
1995, for an interpretation of IV estimates along these lines).
13Due to the need to maintain an adequate food supply to support the War eﬀort, one of
the main considerations for deferment was farm status. We show below that states with a
higher percentage of farmers had substantially lower mobilization rates, and this explains a
considerable share of the variation in state mobilization rates. Also, most military units were
s t i l ls e g r e g a t e di nt h e1940s and there were relatively few black units. Consequently, blacks
were separated from whites for classiﬁcation purposes. This resulted in proportionally fewer
blacks serving in the military than whites and hence states with higher percentages of blacks
also had lower shares of draftees. In addition, individuals of German, Italian and Asian origin
may have been less likely to be drafted due to concerns about sending them to battle against
their countries of origin.
Our measure of the mobilization rate is the fraction of registered males between the ages
of 18 and 44 who were drafted or enlisted for war. It is calculated from the published tables
of the Selective Service System (1956). Since eﬀectively all men in the relevant age range were
registered, our mobilization rate variable is the fraction of men in this age range who have
served. We use this variable as a proxy for the decline in the domestic supply of male labor
induced by the War. Volunteers were not accepted into the military after 1942 and hence the
great majority of those who served, 67 percent, were drafted.10 Therefore, the main source of
variation in mobilization rates is cross-state diﬀerences in draft rates.
Table 3 shows the cross-state relationship between the mobilization rate and a variety of
potential determinants. These right-hand side variables, calculated from the 1940 Census,
measure the percent of males ages 13-44 in each state who were farmers, nonwhite, married,
fathers, German-born or born in other Axis nations (Italy or Japan), or fell in the age brackets
of 13-24 and 24-34. We also calculate average years of completed schooling among males in
this age bracket since, as Table 1 shows, this variable diﬀers signiﬁcantly among high- and
low-mobilization states. We focus on the age bracket 13-44 because men aged 13i n1940 would
be 18i n1945, and thus part of the target (“at-risk”) group.11 Finally, we calculate the number
of draft registration boards per 1,000 males ages 13-44 using Selective Service (1956) paired to
10According to data from Selective Service System (1956), 4,987,14 4m e nw e r ee n l i s t e da n d10,022,367 men
were drafted during the War years. 458,297 males were already serving in the military in 1940 prior to declaration
of hostilities. Since it is probably misleading to count these peacetime enlistees as wartime volunteers, a more
precise estimate of the share of draftees is 70 percent.
11The fathers variable refers to the fraction of women aged 13-44 who had children. Though ideally we would
have this fraction for men, this information is not directly available from Census and hence we use the percent
of women with children, which is presumably highly correlated with the desired variable.
14Census population counts. Draft board prevalence might aﬀect the mobilization rate if states
with greater mobilization infrastructure were able to conduct the draft more rapidly.
Column 1 of Table 3, which includes all of these variables in a regression model simultane-
ously, shows that the farm, schooling and German-born variables are signiﬁcant, while the other
variables are not. The signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the farm variable implies that a state
with 10 percentage points higher farm penetration is predicted to have a 1.7 percentage point
lower mobilization rate. The coeﬃcient on the German-born variable implies that 1 percentage
point higher fraction of population born in Germany translates into over 3 percentage points
lower mobilization. This is a very large eﬀect, though not entirely implausible if our measure
of foreign-born Germans also captures the presence of larger ethnic German enclaves (also note
that the point estimate is signiﬁcantly smaller in later columns). Interestingly, the percent
Italian/Japanese variable has the wrong sign in this regression, but this seems to be because
it is correlated with percent German-born, and when entered individually, it is insigniﬁcant.
Column 2 displays a speciﬁcation that includes only the farm and nonwhite variables, while
c o l u m n3s h o w sas p e c i ﬁcation only with the farm and education variables. Column 4 com-
bines the farm, nonwhite and schooling variables. Due to collinearity, neither the nonwhite nor
schooling variable is individually signiﬁcant.
To explore robustness, column 5 drops the 15 Southern states from the analysis. Their omis-
sion has little impact on the farm or schooling variables, though it does cause the coeﬃcient and
standard error of the nonwhite population share measure to rise substantially. The subsequent
columns add the age structure, ethnic mix, married, father and local draft board variables one
by one to the model in column 4. The only variables that have additional explanatory power
are the age structure and percent German-born variables.
Finally, columns 12a n d13s h o ws pe c i ﬁcations that control for the farm, nonwhite, schooling,
age composition and the German-born variables simultaneously. These speciﬁcations explain
as i g n i ﬁcant part of the variation in state mobilization rates (the R2’s of these two regressions
are, respectively, 0.62 and 0.70). We think of the farm, nonwhite and schooling variables as
capturing potentially “economic” determinants of mobilization rates, and the age composition
and the German-born variables as capturing systematic “non-economic” components, while
the residual 30 percent corresponds to idiosyncratic or non-systematic variation. Below we
present estimates of the eﬀect of mobilization on female labor supply growth that exploit
15various combinations of these sources of variation.
5 WWII Mobilization and Female Labor Supply
5.1 Cross-State Relationships
Figure 2 in the Introduction showed male and female labor force participation and the fraction
of males ages 14-65 who were in active military duty in each year during the years 1940-
1952.12 The rise of women’s labor force participation between 1940 and 1945 closely tracks the
mobilization of males. During these ﬁve years, male labor force participation declined by 16.5
percentage points while female labor force participation rose by 6.0 percentage points. Hence,
the rapid increase in female employment during 1940-1945 appears to be a response to the labor
demand shock caused by WWII mobilization.
By 1949, the size of the military was at peacetime levels, male labor force participation
slightly exceeded pre-War levels, and the demand shock that had induced the increase in female
employment had arguably subsided. Despite the resumption of peacetime conditions, however,
female labor force participation was 5.1 percentage points higher in 1950 than in 1940 (though
0.9 percentage points lower than at the War’s peak).13 If female employment was higher in
1950 than it would have been absent WWII mobilization, this can be thought as the result
of a change in female labor supply behavior induced by the War. Women who worked during
wartime may have potentially increased their earnings capacity or their information about
available jobs, thereby inducing additional labor supply.14 Alternatively, the preferences of
w o m e nw h ow o r k e d — o re v e nt h o s ew h od i dn o t — m a yh a v eb e e na l t e r e db yw i d e s p r e a df e m a l e
labor force participation during the War. Our empirical strategy is to exploit these changes in
female labor supply.
12Numerators for labor force participation and military active duty numbers in Figure 2 are from the Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States (1944/45, 1951,a n d1954), which relies on estimates from Census of
Populations data for years 1940-1942 and Current Population Reports, Series P-50 and P-57, for years 1943-
1952. Denominators are population estimates of U.S. residents ages 14-65 by gender from 1940 and 1950 Census
of Populations. Population estimates are interpolated for years 1940-1948 and 1950-52 assuming a constant ex-
ponential growth rate over 1939-1952. Due to use of the detailed annual labor force series for 1939-1952 in
Figure 2 (which are not available for earlier years), our female labor force participation numbers in this ﬁgure
diﬀer slightly from the series provided by Goldin (1994) and Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002) displayed in
Figure 1.
13As noted earlier, our data sources do not agree on the exact magnitude of the aggregate rise in female labor
force participation during the decade. The Figure 1 data place the rise at 6.0 percentage points rather than 5.1
as in Figure 2.
14In this case, the actual increase in eﬃciency units supplied by female labor may be understated by our
labor supply calculations (which are normally expressed in weeks worked), leading to an underestimate of the
negative eﬀect of female labor supply on female wages.
16Mobilization for WWII was not uniform across states. In low-mobilization states, less than
44 percent of men between the ages of 18-44 served in the War, in contrast to 51.5 percent
of males in high-mobilization states (with a range of 9.2 percentage points between the 10th
and 90th percentile states). Figure 3 showed that female employment did not systematically
vary between high- and low-mobilization states in 19 4 0( s e ea l s oT a b l e1). By 1950, however,
w o m e nw o r k e ds i g n i ﬁcantly more in high-mobilization states. In fact, as shown in the second
panel of the ﬁgure, there is a striking positive relationship between state mobilization rates
and the change in average weeks worked by women from 1940 to 1950. Our hypothesis is that
this change in the cross-state pattern of female employment between 1940 and 1950 reﬂects
the eﬀects of WWII mobilization on female labor supply. Notably, this positive relationship
is unique to the decade of the War. The bottom panel of Figure 3 indicates that there is no
additional relative growth in female labor supply during 1950-1960 in high-mobilization states
(in fact, there is a slight mean reversion).
To investigate the hypothesis more formally, Table 4 reports results from regressions of
female labor supply, measured in weeks worked, on state mobilization rates. These models,
which pool data from 1940 and 1950, have the following structure:
yist = δs + γ1950 + X
0
ist · βt + α · γ1950 · ms + εist. (2)
Here the left-hand side variable, yist, is weeks worked by woman i residing in state s,i ny e a r
t (1940 or 1950). δs denotes a full set of state of residence dummies, and γ1950 is a dummy
for 1950. Xist denotes other covariates including state of birth or country of birth, age, race,
and share of farmers and nonwhites and average schooling in the state in 1940 interacted with
the 1950 dummy, which are included in some of the speciﬁcations. The time subscript on β
indicates that the eﬀects of the X0s on labor supply may diﬀer by decade. The coeﬃcient
of interest is α, which corresponds to the interaction term between the 1950 dummy and the
mobilization rate, ms. To save on terminology, we refer to this interaction term simply as the
“mobilization rate”. This variable measures whether states with higher rates of mobilization
for WWII experienced a greater increase in female employment from 1940 to 1950. Since our
key right-hand side variable, the mobilization rate, varies only by state and year, all standard
errors reported in this paper are corrected for clustering at the state times year level (using
STATA robust standard errors).
17Column 1 is our most parsimonious speciﬁcation, including only state dummies, year main
eﬀects, and the mobilization rate measure. This model indicates that there was a large and
highly signiﬁcant increase in female employment between 1940 and 1950 in high-mobilization
states. The point estimate of 13.9 (standard error 1.8) implies that a 10 percentage point
higher mobilization translated into a 1.4 week increase in female employment between the start
and end of the decade. While suggestive, this speciﬁcation is not entirely appropriate since it
does not control for any individual or state characteristics that might explain the rise in female
labor supply in high-mobilization states. Subsequent columns add a variety of covariates to
this speciﬁcation.
The addition of a full set of age and marital status dummies interacted with year dummies in
column 2 reduces the mobilization rate coeﬃcient by about one-third to 9.6. The diﬀerence in
the point estimate between the ﬁrst two columns indicates that age groups with greater increases
in labor force participation were more populous in high-mobilization states. Column 3 adds
state of birth dummies as a control for cross-state migration (and country of birth dummies
for immigrants). These dummies have little impact. As an additional method of controlling
for the possible endogeneity of women’s location decisions, Appendix Table 1 displays a set of
speciﬁcations comparable to Table 4 (columns 3 and 5) in which WWII mobilization rates are
assigned to women by their state of birth rather than current state of residence as in our main
models. The point estimates and standard errors are very similar to the models in Table 4.
As a ﬁnal check for migration, Panel B of Appendix Table 1 reports results from speciﬁcations
that use (log) total supply of women, measured in aggregate weeks or aggregate eﬃciency units,
as the dependent variable (see below for deﬁnition of aggregate eﬃciency units). Consistent
with the ﬁnding that women worked more on average in 1950 in high-mobilization states, total
female labor supply also grew more in these states.
5.2 Correlation or Mobilization?
The correlations documented above between state mobilization rates and measures of agri-
cultural employment, nonwhite population, and educational attainment raise a concern as to
whether we are simply capturing diﬀerential trends in female employment in non-agricultural,
better-educated, and low-minority states. In that case, the estimated eﬀect of the mobilization
rate on female labor supply growth will reﬂect, at least in part, this correlation. To state
18the concern more concretely, we can think of the variation in cross-state mobilization rates as





s + es. (3)
The ﬁrst of these, me
s, is the component of state mobilization rates that is correlated with
observable economic factors such as agricultural and educational distributions. The second
component, mne
s , is correlated with non-economic factors that we can potentially measure such
as age and ethnicity. Finally, es is a source of other idiosyncratic variation that we cannot proxy
with our existing data. Our estimates so far exploit all three sources of variation in ms.A m o n g
these, me
s is the most problematic since economic factors that cause diﬀerences in mobilization
rate could also potentially impact female labor supply and earnings growth directly between
1940 and 1950.
Our ﬁrst strategy to purge the mobilization measure of potentially problematic variation
is to control directly for several measures of me
s in estimating (2), thus only exploiting the
variation in mobilization rates coming from mne
s and es. To implement this approach, columns
4a n d5o fT a b l e4a d dc o n t r o l sf o rt h ei n t e r a c t i o nb e t w e e nt h e1950 dummy and the fractions
of men who were farmers and who were nonwhite and average schooling among men in 1940.15
The nonwhite and farm interaction terms are typically only marginally signiﬁcant while the
schooling variable is positively related to growth in female labor force participation. But these
variables have little impact on the coeﬃcient on the mobilization rate, which remains between 8
and 10 week and is highly signiﬁcant. Overall, these estimates also imply that a 10 percentage
point higher mobilization rate is associated with an approximately 1 week increase in female
employment.
As an alternative check on the inﬂuence of racial composition on male employment growth,
Panel B of Table 4 limits the sample to white females (recall that we have already limited the
sample to non-farmers). The results in this subsample are comparable to those reported in
Panel A. The baseline estimate is again approximately 9 to 10 weeks, and is similarly robust
in magnitude and signiﬁcance to the inclusion of various covariates.16
Another concern is that there may be signiﬁcant cross-state diﬀerences in the importance of
15Although the component of mobilization rate correlated with fraction nonwhite may be thought to be “non-
economic,” given the changes in the economic status of blacks over this time period, we are more comfortable
classifying this as an “economic” complement.
16We also estimated models with interactions between individual education dummies and year dummies. The
results are very similar to those in Table 4. Tables of these results are available from the authors.
19occupations or industries with a greater demand for women, explaining the diﬀerential growth
in female employment between 1940 and 1950. Table 5 allows for female labor supply growth
to diﬀer by states’ initial occupational and industrial structure. In particular, we control (in
separate regressions) for the interaction between the 1950 dummy and the fraction of males in
1940 in each of 10 one-digit occupations as well as the fraction of men in defense-related in-
dustries.17 T h e s ee s t i m a t e sp r o v i d el i t t l ee v i d e n c eo fd i ﬀerential female labor supply growth by
occupational and industrial structure. The occupation and industry variables are insigniﬁcant
in all but one speciﬁcation, and their inclusion aﬀects neither the magnitude nor the signiﬁcance
of the relationship between WWII mobilization and female labor supply growth.
In terms of the notation of equation (3), the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 exploit two sources
of variation in state mobilization rates: the “non-economic” component, mne
s , and the “idio-
syncratic” component, es. An alternative strategy to explore whether these results may be
interpreted as a causal eﬀect of WWII mobilization on female labor supply growth is to at-
tempt to isolate the non-economic component of the mobilization rate, mne
s . To implement this
approach, we focus on the variation in mobilization rates accounted for by diﬀerences in the
age structure and German heritage of the population of males at risk for mobilization by state
(recall that the fraction of those who were Italian and Japanese did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on mobilization rates in Table 3). Conditioning on individual characteristics, in particular, age
and ethnicity (country of birth), it is plausible that these variables should have no direct eﬀect
on female labor supply growth.
Motivated by this reasoning, we report results from 2SLS estimation of equation (2) in Panel
A of Table 6, using the 1940 age or ethnic structure (or both) as instruments for the mobilization
rate (in these models we also control for percent farmer and male’s average education in 1940).
Though not as precisely estimated, the results of these 2SLS models are similar to the previous
estimates using all components of the variation in mobilization rates and to those that control
for the economic component of the mobilization rate, me
s, directly. Therefore, it appears that all
sources of variation in mobilization rates exert a similar eﬀect on female labor supply during the
decade of the War. It is also encouraging to note that the 2SLS models for male labor supply
in Panel B of Table 6 ﬁnd insigniﬁcant and inconsistently signed eﬀects of mobilization on male
17We deﬁne defense-related industries as those contributing to War Stock material directly related to combat
missions. Examples of defense industries are: aircraft and ship building, motor vehicles and electronic machinery,
metal industries, steel and iron industries, and blast furnaces and rolling mills. A complete list is available from
the authors.
20labor supply during this decade (see Table 8 for a more detailed analysis of the relationship
between male labor supply growth and WWII mobilization).18
We provide a number of further robustness checks on our main estimates in Table 7. Specif-
ically, we present results for a second outcome measure (positive weeks worked), explore the
importance of regional variation to the main ﬁndings, and compare the 1940-1950 results to
estimates for the subsequent decade when there was no mobilization for war. We focus on
speciﬁcations 3 and 5 from Table 4, which are our richest models; the latter includes all state
‘economic’ controls (i.e., farm, nonwhite, and average years of completed schooling, all inter-
acted with the 1950 dummy).
The ﬁrst row of the table indicates that our results are not primarily driven by regional
trends in female labor supply. Adding region dummies (interacted with the 1950 dummy)
corresponding to the 4 Census regions increases the estimated relationship between the mobi-
lization rate and female employment growth, but does not change the overall pattern. Dropping
Southern states, on the other hand, reduces the size of the coeﬃcient. In all cases, the rela-
tionship remains economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
The second row of Table 7 presents identical models where the dependent variable is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if a woman worked positive weeks in the previous year (and zero
otherwise). In all but the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, these models indicate a sizable impact of the
mobilization rate on the share of women participating in the labor force. A ten percent higher
mobilization rate is associated with 1 to 3 percentage points additional growth in female labor
force participation over this decade.19
Panel B of Table 7 presents comparable estimates for the years 1950 to 1960, in this case
interacting the mobilization fraction with a 1960 dummy. These results provide a useful speciﬁ-
cation test since a large increase in female employment in high-mobilization states between 1950
and 1960 would indicate that our mobilization rate variable is likely capturing other secular
18We have also performed a “falsiﬁcation” exercise for this IV approach in which we regress the change in
female (or male) labor supply during 1950-1960 on lagged state age and ethnic variables from the 1950 decade
interacted with a 1960 dummy. F-tests of these “false instruments” are never signiﬁcant in models that use
the state ethnic structure as the instrument. In models that include the age structure age alone or the age
and ethnic structures together, p-values range from 0.01 to 0.03, though age variables have the opposite sign to
those in Table 6.
19We do not investigate the eﬀect of the mobilization rate on the Census variable that is coded as in-the-
labor-force, since in the 1940 census this is equivalent to having an occupation, and women who worked during
the War may still have an occupation even if they are not currently in the labor force. Closely related, however,
we show in Appendix Table 1 that there is a strong positive relationship between WWII mobilization and the
logarithm of total female labor supply to a state.
21cross-state trends in female employment. In no case do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between the mobilization variable and the growth of female labor supply measured as average
weeks worked or any weeks worked over the 1950-60 decade. The cross-state growth in women’s
labor force participation was signiﬁcantly correlated with WWII mobilization rates only during
t h ed e c a d eo ft h eW a r .
To supplement these aggregate patterns, Appendix Tables 2 and 3 present evidence on the
impact of the mobilization rate on female weeks worked by age, education and birth cohort.
We generally ﬁnd that WWII mobilization had the greatest impact on the labor supply of high
school graduate women, women between the ages of 14-44 and the cohorts that were 15-24 or
35-44 in 1940. Point estimates for the impact of mobilization on the labor supply of women
above 54 and those for the cohorts that were 25-34 or 45-54 in 1940 (Appendix Table 3) are
sensitive to the inclusion of the aggregate state variables.20
Finally, it would be useful to complement these results with evidence on whether women
worked relatively more in high-mobilization states during the War years (as well as afterwards).
Unfortunately, we are not aware of a data source with information on state labor force partici-
pation rates by gender during the intra-Census years. Nevertheless, we can partially complete
the picture given by the Census data by investigating whether women worked more in the im-
mediate aftermath of the War (between 1947 and 1950) in high-mobilization states. To do so,
we use the CPS Social Security Earnings Records Exact Match ﬁle which reports information
from Social Security earnings records on quarters worked in covered employment (i.e., private
sector, non-self-employed) for adults interviewed for the CPS in March 1978. These data are
naturally only available for those who survived to 1978 and report valid Social Security num-
bers. Because the quarterly employment data do not start until 1947 and contain only the sum
of quarters worked for the ﬁrst three years of the sample (1947 to 1950), we cannot investi-
gate whether women worked more in high-mobilization states during the War.21 These data
20In 1940, the educational distribution of non-elderly, non-farm females was: less than 8th grade, 27 percent;
exactly 8th grade, 23 percent; 9-11 years, 22 percent; exactly 12y e a r s ,19 percent; 1 or more additional years
beyond high school, 9 percent (3 percentage points of which was accounted for by college graduates). In 1950,
the corresponding numbers were 22, 17, 23, 26, 12a n d5 .
21Because we do not have information on respondents’ state of birth, we use state of residence as an imperfect
proxy. Social Security Numbers (SSNs) are essentially only available for women with positive work history and
hence we treat missing SSNs as indicating no work history (except in cases where respondents refused to provide
a SSN or where the SSN failed to match Social Security data). To attempt to isolate farm workers (who are
typically not in covered employment), we variously dropped women in farming occupations, women with farm
income, and women residing on farms (and all three). These exclusions had little impact on the results. Note
that although the CPS Exact Match ﬁle reports annual quarters worked for 1937-1946, these data are imputed
22nonetheless provide a rare glimpse at women’s employment in the immediate post-war years.
Figure 6 depicts the (standardized) relationship between state mobilization rates and female
employment during 1947 and 1950, and separately in each of the years from 1951 to 1977. For
women who were ages 16-55 in 1945, we run a regression of total quarters of work in a given
period divided by mean quarters of work by women in that period on individual characteristics
(age, education, marital status, and a dummy for nonwhite) and the state mobilization rate.
The ﬁgure plots the coeﬃcients on the mobilization rate measure and the 90 percent conﬁdence
interval for each estimate (using STATA robust standard errors clustered by state). The re-
sults conﬁrm the patterns detected in the Census data: there is a strong relationship between
mobilization rates and female labor employment in 1951, and a weaker but still substantial
relationship in 1959 and 1960. Reassuringly, there appears to have been an even more positive
relationship between the mobilization rate and female labor supply in the years immediately
following the war (1947-1950). Consistent with Goldin’s (1991) ﬁndings, the impact of the
War on female labor supply fades substantially with time, but greater female labor supply in
high-mobilization states appears to persist for at least 15 years after the War’s end.
5.3 Supply Shifts or Demand Shifts?
We have so far interpreted the robust cross-state correlation between mobilization rates and
growth in female employment between 1940 and 1950 as indicative of a shift in female labor
supply. As Figure 2 shows, the aggregate demand shock, the mobilization for war, that had
drawn women into the labor market had almost entirely reversed itself by 1947. There may
still have been post-war diﬀerences in the demand for female labor across states correlated with
WWII mobilization rates, however. For example, men who served in the War may have had
diﬃculty reintegrating into the workforce, or may have taken advantage of the WWII GI Bill
by attaining further education rather than working. If this were the case, greater female labor
force participation in high-mobilization states could reﬂect demand for female labor rather than
diﬀerences in female labor supply.
To explore these possibilities, Table 8 and Appendix Table 1 also provide estimates of labor
supply speciﬁcations for males comparable to those estimated for women in Table 4. These
models ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation between WWII mobilization rates and the growth of male
from aggregate income data for these years and hence are not useful for our analysis.
23labor supply between 1940 and 1950. Depending on covariates, estimates for male labor supply
range from weakly positive to weakly negative and are never signiﬁcant. As noted above, Panel
B of Table 6 also shows no relationship between male labor supply growth and the component
of WWII mobilization correlated with non-economic factors (age structure and ethnic mix).
Hence, it appears that the net growth in male labor supply between 1940 - 1950 was not
systematically lower in high-mobilization states.22
To probe the relationship between mobilization and men’s employment in 1950 further, the
ﬁnal four columns of Table 8 provide separate labor supply estimates for males who did and
d i dn o ts e r v ei nt h eW a r . 23 These models detect a weak positive relationship between state
mobilization and the growth in male labor supply for non-veterans during this decade, but
this relationship is insigniﬁcant and is only visible in speciﬁcations that exclude the interaction
between the 1950 dummy and state aggregate measures (farm share, nonwhite population, and
educational attainment). For models limited to WWII veterans, there is an insigniﬁcant positive
eﬀect of mobilization rates on labor supply when we do not control for the state aggregate
measures, and an insigniﬁcant negative relationship when the state aggregate measures are
included. In net, these models do not provide reason to believe that by the 1950s, male labor
supply was systematically aﬀected by state mobilization rates.
As a ﬁnal piece of evidence, note that Table 9 (discussed below) documents that relative
earnings fell for both genders in high- relative to low-mobilization states. If, contrary to our
presumption, state-level labor demand shifts induced by WWII mobilization persisted to 1950,
we would expect female wages to have risen in high-mobilization states. Similarly, if cross-state
v a r i a t i o ni nf e m a l ee m p l o y m e n tw e r ed r i v e nb yd i ﬀerences in the overall demand for labor in
1950, we would expect both male and female wages to have been higher in high-mobilization
states. These wage results therefore suggest that as of 1950, the enduring eﬀects of WWII
mobilization were realized primarily through additional female labor supply rather than greater
labor demand for either gender (though this last piece of evidence does not imply that there
were no demand-side diﬀerences across states).
22See Stanley (1999) and Bound and Turner (1999) on the eﬀects of GI Bills. As noted by Goldin and Margo
(1992, footnote 24), college attendance under the WWII GI Bill peaked in 1947 and declined sharply after 1949.
23In these specifciations, the 1940 subsample contains all males from the previous columns, while the 1950
subsample is limited to males who report themselves as WWII veterans (columns 6 and 7) and non-veterans
(columns 8 and 9).
246 The Impact of Female Labor Supply On Earnings
The previous section developed the argument that cross-state diﬀerences in WWII mobilization
rates are a plausible source of variation in female labor supply in 1950. This section exploits
this source of variation in female employment to estimate the eﬀect of female supply on a range
of labor market outcomes.
6.1 Initial Evidence
Figure 4 showed the negative relationship between state WWII mobilization rates and the
change in average weekly (log) female and male wages during 1940 and 1950 at the state level.
We now investigate these relationships formally.
Table 9 presents our ﬁrst set of regression estimates for the impact of female labor supply
on wages. For the sake of transparency, we initially take the approach of regressing female and
male log weekly earnings on our measure of weeks worked by women from the previous section.
We present both OLS models and instrumental-variables (IV) estimates in which the female
labor supply measure is instrumented by state mobilization rates. Figure 4 above corresponds
to the reduced form for the IV estimates (without covariates). More formally, the estimating
equation is:
lnwist = δs + γ1950 + X
0
ist · βt + φ · Yst + uist. (4)
The left-hand side variable is log weekly earnings, lnwist, while the endogenous regressor is
average weeks worked by women in the state of residence of individual i, Yst.I na l ls p e c i ﬁcations,
we include state of residence dummies, a dummy for 1950, a complete set of education dummies,
a quartic in experience, and a dummy for marital status. Models that include nonwhites also
include a nonwhite dummy. The coeﬃcient of interest, φ,m e a s u r e st h ee ﬀect of female labor
supply on earnings. As indicated by the time subscript on the coeﬃcient vector, βt,w ea l l o wt h e
wage diﬀerential associated with each individual level covariate to diﬀer by decade (similarly
to the OLS models of Table 2). Standard errors are again clustered to account for the fact that
the labor supply measure operates at the state by year level.
We estimate equation (4) using both OLS and IV/2SLS models. In the IV models, the
ﬁrst-stage equation is analogous to equation (2) above, except that the endogenous variable
in this case is not women’s individual weeks of work, but average weeks worked per woman
25in each state. This ﬁrst-stage relationship is tabulated directly below the point estimate in
each column. The excluded instrument is the interaction between the 1950 dummy and the
mobilization rate. The exclusion restriction implied by this instrumental-variables strategy is
that diﬀerential mobilization rates aﬀe c tw o m e n ’ sw a g e sa c r o s ss t a t e so n l yt h r o u g ht h e i ri m p a c t
on female labor supply. Based upon the evidence presented in the previous section, we believe
that this exclusion restriction is plausible.
It is important to bear in mind that estimates of φ do not have a direct structural inter-
pretation in terms of our model in Section 2. As the theory underscores, the impact of female
labor supply on total male and female earnings should depend upon the (log) ratio of female
to male labor supply (as well as the supply of other nonlabor factors). Hence, unless female
labor supply (in OLS or instrumented form) is uncorrelated with male labor supply, we cannot
directly recover the relevant demand and substitution elasticities from estimates of (4). We
therefore view these results as descriptive and adopt a more structural approach in subsequent
tables.
In column 1, we begin with a parsimonious speciﬁcation which indicates that a 1 week
increase in female labor supply is associated with a 10.7 percent decline in female weekly earn-
ings. Given that women’s labor supply averaged 10.7 weeks in 1940 (Table 1), and assuming
no correlation between (instrumented) female labor supply and male labor supply, this point
estimate would correspond to a female labor demand elasticity of -1.14. In the next column,
we add aggregate measures of female age structure by state to the regression model. These
measures control for the correlation between state mobilization rates and female age struc-
ture.24 Inclusion of age controls reduces the estimated wage impact of female labor supply by
approximately 25 percent to -7.0 percentage points for a 1-week increase, which remains highly
signiﬁcant. Column 4 adds the interaction between the 1950 dummy and the 1940 aggregate
state measures—share farm, share nonwhite, and average education—thus allowing diﬀerential
wage growth in farming, high-minority and low-education states. These interactions reduce
the magnitude of the estimate by one-third and increase the standard error. The lower panel
repeats the results for the white sample with similar results but slightly greater precision. The
negative estimated impact of female labor supply on mean female earnings is in all cases signif-
icant (in the ﬁnal speciﬁcations, at the 10 percent level) and, as suggested by theory, indicates
24Female age structure variables measure the share of female state residents ages 14-64 in each of the following
age categories (with one omitted): 14-17, 18-24, 25-34, 45-54, 55-64.
26that the demand curve for female labor is downward sloping (at least in the short run).
Comparing these IV estimates to the corresponding OLS estimates in the table, which are
typically weakly negative and never signiﬁcant, suggests that the OLS estimates are likely
biased upward (i.e., towards zero). It appears, not surprisingly, that cross-state variation in
female labor supply during this decade was jointly determined by a combination of demand and
supply shifts. By isolating the component of female employment that is plausibly orthogonal
to demand, our IV estimates show a substantially larger eﬀect of female labor supply on female
earnings.
The subsequent columns of Table 9 present corresponding estimates for male earnings, both
for the full sample and for the white subsample. Contrary to the case of female earnings,
theory does not make strong predictions for male earnings: they should decline if male and
female labor inputs are close substitutes and nonlabor inputs are supplied inelastically to state
labor markets in the short run. In the data, we detect negative eﬀects of female labor supply on
male earnings. All point estimates are highly signiﬁcant except those in the ﬁnal speciﬁcations
where we control for the interaction between the 1950 dummy and several state aggregate
measures. Interestingly, the estimated eﬀects of female labor supply on male earnings are
consistently 30 to 40 percent smaller in absolute magnitude than the corresponding estimates
for female earnings. This result suggests that female labor supply is an imperfect substitute
for male labor supply, a point which we explore in greater detail below. Once again, the IV
estimates are more negative than the corresponding OLS estimates, consistent with the view
that OLS estimates are biased towards zero due to simultaneity, and that demand for male and
female labor are positively correlated.25
The ﬁnal columns of Table 9 present wage results estimated separately for male WWII
veterans and non-veterans. These columns provide an important speciﬁcation test. If aggregate
wage eﬀects for males were driven exclusively by lower wages for veterans, we would be worried
about having primarily detected the adverse eﬀects of war reintegration on veterans’ earnings.26
25Also notice that the negative eﬀects on female wages are unlikely to be accounted by the labor force
participation of women with lower earnings capacity (cf. Smith and Ward, 1984). First, as Appendix Table
2 shows, marginal labor market participants were relatively highly educated, so there is no compelling reason
to expect that they will be adversely selected on unobserved skills. Second, to rationalize the wage eﬀect we
estimate, i.e., over 10 percent decline in wages in response to a 10 percent increase in employment, with the
participation of less skilled women, we would need the marginal participants to earn negative wages!
26Angrist and Krueger (1994) present evidence that WWII veterans were positively selected, and Angrist
(1990) presents evidence that Vietnam Era veterans experienced earnings losses due to foregone civilian expe-
rience.
27The estimates in Table 9 indicate signiﬁcant negative wage eﬀects of female labor supply for
both non-veterans and veterans. Interestingly, the point estimates for veterans are somewhat
more negative than those of non-veterans. This pattern is consistent with Richard Freeman’s
“Active Labor Market” hypothesis: veterans, as recent labor market (re-)entrants, may have
borne a greater brunt of the wage eﬀects of rising female labor supply.
Appendix Tables 4 estimates models similar to those in Table 9, while controlling for inter-
actions between the 4 Census regions and year, or dropping all Southern state. These results
are quite similar to our baseline estimates, indicating that the negative relationship between
the mobilization-induced changes in female labor supply and changes in earnings is not driven
primarily by Southern states or regional trends.
Given the substantial convergence in regional wage levels that took place among U.S. states
during the 1940s (Wright, 1986), we were also concerned that wage patterns detected in Table
9m i g h tr e ﬂect a process of “catching up” whereby agricultural states, which generally had
low-mobilization rates, gained ground on the rest of the nation during this decade. To check
this possibility, we augmented the Table 9 models to control for the 1940 level of wages for
the relevant demographic group (interacted with a 1950 dummy). Appendix Table 5 reports
the results of this exercise. This lagged wage variable is negative and generally signiﬁcant
indicating that states with initially higher wage levels experienced smaller wage gains during
the decade. The important ﬁnding however is that the inclusion of the lagged measure does not
aﬀect our general conclusions. In models without state aggregate measures, point estimates of
the eﬀect of mobilization on wages are lower than the models without lagged wages, but they
are higher when the state aggregate measures are included. In all speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of
mobilization-induced changes in female employment on female wages is statistically signiﬁcant,
and the eﬀect on male wages is always negative, and is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations except for
those that control for the interactions between the 1950 dummy and aggregate state measures.27
27The results are also unlikely to be driven by institutional changes taking place in the U.S. labor market
during this time period. The two major institutional changes of this era are increases in unionization and the
imposition, and then removal, of the National War Labor Board (NWLB), which was responsible for approving,
and limiting, wage increases.
The NWLB and other price controls are unlikely to be responsible for our results. The NWLB, which was
e s t a b l i s h e di nJ a n u a r y1942, was dissolved in December 1945, and eﬀectively all wartime price controls were
lifted in November 1946 (see Rockoﬀ, 1984), three years before our post-war observations.
We have also estimated the key labor supply and wage models in Tables 4 and 9 while controlling for diﬀerential
trends in unionization across states during these years (using data from Troy and Sheﬂin, 1985). Controlling
for unionization has little impact on the ﬁndings, and a supplemental table of estimates is available on request.
286.2 Using Mobilization Rates to Estimate Elasticities of Demand and Substitution
The wage estimates in Table 9 employ average female weeks as the endogenous regressor.
This approach will lead to correct estimates of the elasticity of demand or substitution only
if (instrumented) female labor supply is uncorrelated with male labor supply. Although this
condition may be satisﬁed, it would be preferable to exploit exogenous variation in male and
female labor supply simultaneously. Using a single instrument, we cannot separately identify
both sources of variation. We can, however, use the mobilization rate to instrument the (log)
ratio of female to male labor supply in a state. This approach surmounts the problem of treating
male labor supply as exogenous and thereby brings us closer to the speciﬁcation suggested by
the theoretical model. The equation that we estimate is:















where the sample now includes all individuals (male and female), fi is a dummy for female,
Fst is total labor supplied by women and Mst is total labor supplied by men in the state of
residence of individual i. As indicated by the super- and subscripts on β
g
t, each of the individual
and state aggregate control measures included in the model (contained in Xist) is permitted to
impact male and female earnings diﬀerentially by gender and decade.
In this equation, there are two coeﬃcients of interest, χ and η.T h ec o e ﬃcient χ measures
the direct impact of increases in (relative) female labor supply on male and female earnings,
and η measures the diﬀerential eﬀect of female labor supply on female wages. Hence, η is
an estimate of the inverse elasticity of substitution between male and female labor, and the
quantity χ + η is an estimate of the inverse elasticity of demand for female labor.
In the ﬁrst four columns of Table 10, we present estimates of equation (5) where the labor
supply measure is constructed as the log ratio of total female to male weeks supplied in each
state and the control variables correspond to those used in the four speciﬁcations in Table 9.
First-stage estimates, tabulated in each column, indicate that WWII mobilization substantially
aﬀected relative gender labor supplies. A 10 percent higher mobilization rate is estimated to
have induced a 10 to 20 percent increase in the log ratio of female to male labor supply, an
impact which is always precisely estimated and highly signiﬁcant.28
28This is a sensible magnitude. For example, an increase in the female to male ratio of labor input from 0.30
to 0.35 percent correponds to a 15 log point increase in the this ratio.
29We next turn to elasticity estimates. The point estimates in the ﬁrst two rows of Table
10, corresponding to χ and η in equation (5), are consistently negative, economically sizable,
and with few exceptions, highly signiﬁc a n t .T h i ss e to fr e s u l t sc o n ﬁrms the ﬁndings above that
the demand curve for female labor is downward sloping and that women are relatively close
substitutes for men.
Summing χ and η to obtain an estimate of the (inverse) elasticity of demand for female labor,
σF,w eﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in relative female labor supply reduced female wages by
6t o7p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s .T h e s ew a g ee ﬀects correspond to an own-labor demand elasticity of
between -1.4 and -1.7 and are therefore slightly larger in magnitude than the “naive” estimates
above. The lower panel of the table presents analogous wage estimates for the subsample of
white female wage earners, for whom we ﬁnd comparable demand elasticities.
The impact of female labor supply on wages is not uniform between the two genders, how-
ever. As is visible in the second row of Table 10 (and as was suggested by Table 9), the wage
eﬀects of (relative) increases in female labor supply are uniformly more negative for women
than they are for men. A 10 percent increase in female labor supply lowers female wages
relative to male wages by about 3 percentage points. By implication, female and male labor
inputs are highly, but not perfectly, substitutable. In particular, the point estimates for η,
corresponding to the inverse elasticity of substitution σMF, imply a substitution elasticity in
the range of -3, with slightly smaller implied elasticities in the models that include aggregate
state controls. Again, elasticities are similar in Panel B, where estimates are limited to white
males and females.
6.3 Measuring labor supply in efficiency units
As a check on the above results, we also estimate models that replace the aggregate weeks of
labor supply measure with a measure of labor supply calculated in eﬃciency units following
the approach of Welch (1969). Conceptually, eﬃciency unit calculations aggregate various
demographic subgroups according to their estimated relative productivities to obtain total labor
supply by gender. To implement this approach, we use the 19 4 0C e n s u ss a m p l et oc a l c u l a t e
average weekly earnings for full-time, full-year workers in the following education by race by
gender categories within each state: 5 age categories (13-23, 24-33, 34-43, 44-53, and 54-63); 5
education categories for whites (<8 years, exactly 8 year, between 8 and 12 years, exactly 12
30years, and greater than 12 years of schooling); and 3 education categories for nonwhites (<5
years, exactly 5 years to exactly 8 years, and greater than 8 years of completed schooling).29
Under the assumption that wages are proportional to marginal productivity, this approach
allows us to “quality adjust” aggregate labor input, thereby relaxing the assumption that there
is perfect substitutability of labor input within each gender.
Using this matrix of 3,760 eﬃciency unit weights (47 states by 80 cells), we assign each male
and female in our labor supply sample the eﬃciency weight corresponding to her demographic
characteristics and state of residence, αg
aers,w h e r eg denotes genders, a indexes age bracket,
e indexes education categories, r indexes race, and s indexes states. We calculate aggregate
















where Faers is the weeks of labor supplied by females in the state with the relevant demographic
characteristics and Maers is the corresponding quantity for males (and, as always, all calculations
use Census sampling weights).
Estimates of equation (5) that use labor supply measured in eﬃciency units are shown in
columns 5-8 of Table 10. The ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients from these estimates are slightly smaller
in magnitude than the corresponding weeks-based estimates, which may imply that marginal
female labor force entrants drawn into the labor market by mobilization had lower average
productivity than incumbent participants. We ﬁnd that the elasticities of demand and sub-
stitution calculated from these eﬃciency-unit based estimates are not systematically diﬀerent
from those estimated using the weeks-worked measure. Hence, these results appear to conﬁrm
our previous ﬁndings. In the subsequent tables, we employ the weeks-worked measure since it
is more transparent.
29Because non-whites had substantially less schooling than whites in 1940, it was necessary to use fewer
education categories with diﬀerent cutpoints in calculating non-white eﬃciency units. We normalize each cell
by the wages of white, male high school graduates, ages 24-33 in each state in 1940, so each worker’s labor
input is expressed relative to the weekly full-time labor input of a prime-age white male high school graduate
in his or her state. Where cells are empty for given states, we impute them as the population weighted average
(normalized) eﬃciency units of the corresponding cells from other states. Note that the normalization of wages
by a given demographic group is for convenience only and does not impact the ratios computed.
316.4 Differences between Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities
As noted in the Introduction and Section 2, the estimates reported in this paper are likely to
correspond to short-run elasticities. In general, it is of great interest to know whether short-
and long-run elasticities diﬀer substantially. Since, as shown in Figure 3, there was only a small
amount of mean reversion in female employment during the 1950s, states with greater WWII
mobilization also had greater female employment in 1960. By exploiting the 20-year changes
between 1940 and 1960, we can investigate whether the short-run impact of increased female
employment is diﬀerent from its long-run impact. We perform this exercise in Appendix Table
6, by estimating models identical to those in Table 10e x c e p tt h a tt h et w od e c a d e sw en o w
cover are 1940 and 1960.
Comparing the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients on the mobilization rate interaction between Table 10
and Appendix Table 7, we see that mobilization had a large eﬀect on the growth of relative
female labor supply not only between 1940 and 1950, but also between 1940 and 1960. For
example, in column 1 of Appendix Table 6, the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient is 2.1,c o m p a r e dt o2 . 0 5
in Table 10. However, the standard error is much larger. Thus, not surprisingly, some of the
2SLS estimates will be less precise. Moreover, in models that control for interactions between
the 1960 dummy and share of farmers, nonwhites, and average education in 1940, there is no
ﬁrst-stage relationship between mobilization and female employment growth between 1940 and
1960.
The models in Appendix Table 6 that do not control for the state aggregates show that the
eﬀect of relative female employment on male wages is broadly comparable between 1940-50 and
1940-60 (columns 1-3 and 5-7). However, the eﬀect of relative female labor supply on male-
female diﬀerentials is much weaker for the 20-year state level changes. In fact, the estimates are
essentially zero and the standard error bands easily exclude the short-run elasticity estimate
from Table 10 (though the main eﬀect, which captures the impact on the level of male and
female earnings, is sometimes as large as those in Table 10). This is consistent with the notion
that the long-run relative demand curve for women’s labor is considerably more elastic than
the short-run relative demand curve, or even perhaps perfectly elastic. This could be due to
adjustment of nonlabor inputs that are ﬁxed in the short-run (LeChatelier principle), changes
in technology or in the organization of production favoring women in areas with greater female
employment (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002), or changes in trade patterns that require suﬃcient time
32to equilibrate.
7 Does Female Labor Supply Raise Male Earnings Inequality?
The results above establish that female labor supply lowers male earnings. But this impact
need not be uniform throughout the male wage distribution. Indeed, several of the authors
cited in the Introduction have argued that rising female labor supply over recent decades is
in part responsible for growing male earnings inequality in the U.S. labor market.30 Greater
female labor supply will generally raise male earnings inequality if women are closer substitutes
to low earnings males than high earnings males.
We take three angles of attack to investigate the relationship between female labor supply
and male earnings inequality, in all cases exploiting the WWII-induced increase in female
employment. First, we ask whether female labor supply aﬀects earnings diﬀerentials between
males at high, medium and low levels of education–speciﬁcally college graduates, high school
graduates and those with 8th grade or lower education.31 Next, we explore how rising female
labor supply changes the level of inequality between various quantiles of the male earnings
distribution, for example the 90-50 and 50-10 log earnings ratios. Finally, we ask whether female
labor supply also aﬀects residual earnings inequality–that is, the inequality that remains after
accounting for observable individual characteristics.
7.1 The Impact of Female Labor Supply on Male Educational Differentials
We begin with educational diﬀerentials. Consider a variant of equation (5) in which the de-
pendent variable is log weekly earnings of males of two education groups—initially, college and
high school graduates, later high school and 8th grade graduates:
lnw
m






















30On rising male earnings inequality see, among many others: Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and
Johnson (1992) on supply and demand factors; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) on the role of changing skill
premia in the increase in residual inequality; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1995) and Lee (1999) on the role
of labor market institutions; and Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Machin and Van Reenan (1998), and
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) on the role of computerization. Levy and Murnane (1992), Bound and Johnson
(1995), Katz and Autor (1999), and Acemoglu (2002) provide surveys of this literature. See the Introduction
for cites to studies of the relationship between female labor supply and male earnings inequality.
31In 1940, 28 percent of males had less than an 8th grade education, 24 percent had exactly 8th grade, 22
percent had more than 8th grade but less than high school, 15 percent exactly a high school degree, and the
remaining 10 percent had more than high school education (5 percent with college or above). In 1950, the
corresponding numbers were 24, 18, 22, 20, and 15 (7 percent with college or above).
33In this equation, ci is a dummy for whether individual i is a college graduate (the omitted group
being high school graduates), Fst/Mst is relative female labor supply measured in aggregate
weeks worked as above, and Cm
st/Hm
st is the relative supply of college versus high school male
labor input.32 All covariates are allowed to have diﬀerent eﬀects on earnings of college and
non-college males and to diﬀer by decade.
The coeﬃcients of interest in this equation are χ and η.T h e c o e ﬃcient χ measures the
impact of female labor supply on the earnings of high school graduates, and η gives the eﬀect
of female labor supply on the relative wages of college versus high school graduates. Therefore,
keeping the employment levels of college and high school graduate males constant, we can think
of σfh =1 /χ as the cross-elasticity of demand between female labor and high school gradu-
ates and σfc =1 /(χ + η) as the cross-elasticity of demand between female labor and college
graduates. The ratio of cross-elasticities of females for high school versus college graduates,
σ
f
hc ≡ σfh/σfc, is therefore (χ + η)/χ .I fσ
f
hc is less than 1, this implies that female labor has
a more (negative) wage impact on high school graduates, so females are closer substitutes to
high school than to college males, and vice versa if σ
f
hc > 1.
Consistent with our previous results, we anticipate that the main eﬀect of female labor
supply on both college and high school wages, χ, is negative. Since relative supplies of male
college versus high school graduates, Cm
st/Hm
st, should also directly impact the male college/high
school premium, we must either control for this measure or assume that instrumented female
labor supply measure is uncorrelated with it. We implement both approaches below and ﬁnd
that the choice is not consequential for our results.
While the college/high school wage diﬀerential is of great contemporary interest, the vast
majority of males in our 1950 sample (85 percent) had high school or less education, with
the two modes of the distribution found at exactly high school completers (20.3 percent) and
exactly 8th grade completers (18.2 percent). Therefore, it is of interest to ask whether female
labor supply raised or lowered earnings inequality between these groups of males as well. After
estimating equation (7) for the college/high school diﬀerential, we perform analogous estimates
32In models that use the male college/high school relative supply, college labor supply is the sum of total
weeks worked supplied by college-plus graduates plus half of those supplied by those with some college; high
school labor supply is the sum of weeks worked supplied by high school graduates or less plus half of those
supplied by those with some college. In models that use the male high school/8th grade relative supply, high
school labor input is the sum of weeks worked supplied by those with high school or more plus half of that
supplied by those with more than 8th grade and less than high school education; 8th grade is the sum of weeks
worked supplied by those those with 8th grade or less, plus half of that supplied by those with more than 8th
grade and less than high school.
34for the high school/8th grade diﬀerential.
E s t i m a t e so fe q u a t i o n( 7 )f o rc o l l e g ea n dh i g hs c h o o lg r a d u a t e s ,s h o w ni np a n e lAo fT a b l e
11, reveal that growth in female labor supply exerts a small positive eﬀect on male college/high
school earnings inequality. A 10 percent increase in female labor supply is predicted to lower
male high school wages by 2.5 to 4 log points while reducing college wages by only 1 to 2.5
percentage points. These point estimates imply a relative cross-elasticity of demand σ
f
hc of 0.4
to 0.6, but this elasticity is imprecisely estimated. This evidence is consistent with the view
that females drawn into the labor force by WWII mobilization were more substitutable for
high school than college educated men (consistent with the characteristics of female labor force
entrants documented in Appendix Table 2). But we cannot reject the hypothesis that women’s
labor supply reduced college and high school wages by equivalent amounts.
This ambiguity does not carry over to the corresponding results for the impact of female
labor supply on the male 8th grade/high school diﬀerential. These estimates, found in Panel
Bo fT a b l e11, have the opposite sign to and are somewhat larger than those for the male
college/high school wage premium. They are also more precisely estimated. A 10 percent
increase in female labor supply is estimated to reduce male high school relative to 8th grade
earnings by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points. This relative wage impact is highly signiﬁcant in
speciﬁcations that do not control for state aggregate measures. In models that include these
aggregates, the estimate is of similar magnitude but is less precise. Interestingly, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that female labor supply had no impact on the wages of 8th grade males.
In net, the primary impact of increased female labor supply on male educational inequality
during the 1940s was to lower the wages of male high school graduates relative to more-educated
males, and particularly relative to less-educated males. This suggests that during the WWII
era, females were closer substitutes to males at the middle of the skill distribution than to
males in either of the tails. Given that low-educated males in 1950 were reasonably likely to be
employed in manual occupations, it is plausible that women would indeed be worse substitutes
for them than for their high school graduate brethren. This result stands in some contrast
to Grant and Hamermesh’s (1981) and Topel’s (1994) OLS ﬁndings that high-skill women are
strong substitutes for low-skill males. Of course, our ﬁndings are from another era and these
substitution parameters need not be ﬁxed over long intervals.
357.2 The Impact of Female Labor Supply on the Distribution of Male Earnings
Because women’s labor force entry during the 1940s appears to have raised earnings inequality
between college and high school males while lowering it for high school versus 8th grade educated
males, the net impact on male inequality is–at this point–ambiguous. Educational inequality
is however only one component of earnings diﬀerentials, and the total impact of female labor
supply on male inequality could in principle be quite diﬀerent than its impact on educational
inequality.
To provide a more complete picture of these potential eﬀects, we adopt a less structural
approach. Using observed male earnings distributions and estimated residual male earnings
distributions by state, we deﬁne state level inequality metrics as the log diﬀerence between
various quantiles of the earnings or residual earnings distribution, such as the 90-50 or 50-10
diﬀerential. We then explore whether WWII-induced increases in female labor supply raised
or lowered these inequality measures. To implement this approach, we ﬁrst estimate standard
wage regressions of the form:
lnwist = δs + γ1950 + X
0
ist · βt + vist, (8)
where wit is weekly earnings for male i residing in state s in year t. In the “overall inequality”
speciﬁcation, we include only state dummies and a year main eﬀect. In the “residual inequality”
model, the vector Xist includes a full set of education dummies, a quartic in potential experience,
nonwhite, state of residence, state or country of birth, veteran status, and marital status
dummies, as well as controls for state female age structure by year. A third set of models add
state-level macro controls (share farmer and nonwhite, and average education in 1940). The
fact that βt is indexed by t indicates that returns to these observed characteristics are allowed
to vary by decade. We also brieﬂyl o o ka tm e a s u r e so fw a g ei n e q u a l i t yt h a tc o m b i n ew o r k e r s
from both genders.
The measures of overall or residual inequality are calculated separately in each state and
year as the diﬀerence between the 90th and the 10th (or 50th and 10th, etc.) percentile values
of the corresponding residual distribution, vist, and are denoted by v
90−10
st etc. Observe that
the residual distribution in the “overall” inequality model is simply the demeaned log earnings
distribution in each state.
We then use these inequality measures as the left-hand side variable in Table 12. The typical
36regression takes the form:
v
90−10








st is the 90-10d i ﬀerential, the endogenous regressor, Fst/Mst is again relative female
labor supply (in weeks), and the instrument is the state mobilization rate, ms,i n t e r a c t e dw i t h
the 1950 dummy. To move from micro- to macro-data (i.e., from individual Census observations
to state level aggregates) without losing the information provided by the micro-level controls,
we orthogonalize both the instrumental variable and the endogenous regressor with respect
to all of the covariates in Xist to form the state level measures used in the second stage of
estimation.
The ﬁr s tc o l u m ni nT a b l e12l a b e l e dM e a n∆ provides estimates of mean state-level change
in earnings inequality from 1940 to 1950. The sizable decline in earnings inequality visible in
the table reﬂects the well-known “Great Compression” studied by Goldin and Margo (1992).
Over the decade of the War, male 90-50 and 50-10d i ﬀerentials each declined by close to 17l o g
points.
The ﬁrst set of regression estimates in speciﬁcation 1 examines the state-level relationship
between growth in the log relative supply of female labor input (instrumented with the mobi-
lization rate) and the contemporaneous change in overall state level earnings inequality. The
net impact of female labor supply on male earnings inequality is positive and sizable. A 10
percent increase in female labor input is estimated to widen the 90-10e a r n i n g sd i ﬀerential by
5.5 log points, which is highly signiﬁcant. It is noteworthy that this entire impact occurs in
the upper half of the male earnings distribution. Consistent with our ﬁndings for the impact
of female labor supply on the wage gap between middle- and low-education males, increases in
female labor supply appear to cause some compression below the median of the distribution,
though this impact is not signiﬁcant. An interesting implication of these estimates is that with-
out the WWII-induced increase in female labor force participation the “Great Compression”
would have been even “greater” in the sense that wage inequality among males would have
declined even further between 1940 and 1950.33
33Interestingly and consistent with our ﬁndings, Goldin and Margo (1992, p. 27) notice a similar pattern of
widening inequality in industries with high female employment: “Industries that were female-intensive (cigars,
men’s neckwear, woolen and worsted mills) comprise an obvious exception [to the trend of wage compression]...
Rather than experiencing a narrowing of the wage structure from the prewar to the wartime or postwar periods,
their distributions actually widened.”
37When we look at the impact of female labor force participation on wage inequality among all
workers (male and female) in Panel C, we ﬁnd much larger eﬀects. Now a 10 percent increase
in female labor supply widens the 90-10 earnings diﬀerential by 1.4 log points. This much
larger eﬀect is not surprising; greater female participation both increases male wage inequality
directly, as we have already established, and also adds more women to the distribution who, at
this time, were paid considerably less than men.
Panel B of the table presents comparable estimates for the white subsample. In this case
the impact of female labor supply on inequality above the median is somewhat less positive
while the impact on inequality below the median is somewhat more negative. This estimate
suggests that female labor supply primarily reduces male earnings at a lower point in the white
male earnings distribution than in the overall earnings distribution, which appears plausible
given the substantial racial disparities in education and earnings in this period.
The subsequent two columns of Panels A and B present estimates of the impact of female
labor supply on residual male inequality. The impact of female labor supply on residual in-
equality is about half as large as the impact on overall inequality, but still sizable. A 10 percent
increase in female labor supply is estimated to raise the male 90-10 earnings diﬀerential by
1.5 to 2 log points. The columns numbered (2) present residual estimates in which state level
macro controls (share nonwhite and farm, and average education) are included in the ﬁrst stage
models. The point estimates are typically less precise than previous estimates.
Overall, the results reported in this section show a substantial eﬀect of female employment
growth on overall and residual inequality among men at midcentury. These results therefore
provide some support to the hypotheses advanced in Fortin and Lemieux (2000) and Topel (1994
and 1997), linking female labor supply to rising male inequality–though distinct from the hy-
potheses of these authors, female labor appears to increase male inequality not by competing
with low-skill males, but by increasing dispersion at the top of the male wage distribution.
Interestingly, the eﬀects we ﬁnd are large enough to “explain” a large fraction of the recent
increase in male wage inequality as resulting from the concurrent sizable rise in female employ-
ment. This conclusion may be premature, however, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the education levels
and characteristics of women who increased their labor supply during the decade diﬀer substan-
tially from those of the marginal female labor market participants of today. The structure of
production has also changed substantially since midcentury. Accordingly, substitution elastici-
38ties we estimate from midcentury may not be directly comparable to the elasticities today. And
second, as noted before, our estimates correspond to short-run elasticities, which may be quite
diﬀerent from long-run elasticities as the results in Appendix Table 6 suggest.34 To understand
the eﬀect of female employment on the increase in male wage inequality over the past three
decades, the relevant elasticities are long-run elasticities. Work exploiting additional sources of
variation in recent female employment growth is necessary to make progress on uncovering the
links between rising female labor supply and recent changes in the structure of earnings.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The epochal rise in female labor force participation is one of the most profound labor market
transformations of the past century. And yet, the economics profession knows relatively little
about the labor market consequences of increased female labor force participation. An empirical
investigation of this issue requires a source of variation in female employment that is orthogonal
to demand for female (and also male) labor.
In this paper, we developed the argument that the diﬀerential extent of mobilization for
WWII across U.S. states provides a useful source of variation to identify the eﬀects of women’s
labor force participation on a range of labor market outcomes. We documented that in 1950
women participated more in states where a larger fraction of working-age males served in the
military during the mid-1940s. This diﬀerential female labor supply behavior does not seem to
be accounted for by other cross-state diﬀerences or possible demand factors, and is not present
in the 1940 data. We interpret this as a shift in female labor supply induced by the mobilization
for the War.
Using this source of variation, we estimate the eﬀect of greater female participation on
female and male wages, returns to education, and wage inequality among men. Our results
indicate more downward sloping demand curves for female labor, and a closer degree of sub-
stitutability between males and females than suggested by OLS estimates, presumably because
OLS regressions are biased towards-zero by simultaneous demand-induced variation in female
employment. We also ﬁnd that, contrary to a common hypothesis in the literature, women are
not the closest substitutes to the lowest education males, but to high school graduate males (at
34In addition, as noted by, among others, Blau and Kahn (1994, 1997), the gender wage gap closed substan-
tially during the 1980s as female employment was rising, suggesting that demand shifts favoring women may
be an important component of the rise in female labor supply.
39least at midcentury). Nevertheless, because greater female participation increases inequality
in the top half of the male wage distribution, our estimates suggest sizable eﬀects of female
labor force participation on male wage inequality. This ﬁnding indicates that a more detailed
investigation of the relationship between the increase in female labor supply and the recent
widening inequality among males would be fruitful.
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43All Low Med. High All Low Med. High All Low Med. High
11.2 10.9 11.3 11.4 13.7 12.8 13.9 14.4 16.6 15.8 16.8 17.2
(1.7) (1.6) (1.8) (1.8) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.4)
2.61 2.33 2.67 2.76 3.60 3.45 3.64 3.66 4.06 3.92 4.08 4.15
(0.27) (0.29) (0.20) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.11)
35.8 34.9 36.0 36.5 37.3 36.4 37.7 37.8 38.0 37.4 38.3 38.3
(1.1) (1.2) (0.9) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6) (0.9) (0.6)
9.0 8.5 9.1 9.4 9.7 9.2 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.0 10.4 10.7
(0.7) (0.9) (0.4) (0.6) (0.7) (0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4)
34.3 34.2 34.6 34.1 38.7 38.3 39.1 38.5 40.1 38.8 40.3 40.8
(1.7) (1.4) (1.6) (2.0) (1.6) (2.0) (1.7) (1.1) (1.6) (1.7) (1.5) (1.2)
3.23 3.07 3.27 3.32 4.07 3.96 4.09 4.13 4.60 4.49 4.62 4.67
(0.18) (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.19) (0.09) (0.08)
35.8 34.7 36.2 36.4 37.4 36.4 37.7 37.8 37.7 36.8 38.1 38.1
(1.2) (1.4) (1.0) (0.7) (1.1) (1.2) (0.9) (0.6) (1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (0.8)
9.1 8.6 9.2 9.4 9.7 9.1 9.8 10.1 10.4 9.8 10.4 10.8
(0.6) (0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4)
All Low Med. High All Low Med. High All Low Med. High
47.8 44.0 47.6 51.5 13.4 23.9 11.4 6.9 8.6 16.8 6.9 3.6
(3.2) (1.4) (1.0) (1.9) (10.8) (10.2) (8.8) (6.4) (10.1) (15.2) (5.8) (2.1)
Percent Mobilized 1940-47 Share Farmers 1940 Share Non-White 1940
C. State Aggregates: Males Ages 13-44 in 1940
A. Non-Farm Females Ages 14 - 64
Mean Age
Mean Year of  
Schooling 
Mean Year of  
Schooling 
Log  Weekly 
Earnings
Mean Age





Log  Weekly 
Earnings
Table 1:  Characteristics of U.S. State Residents in Low, Medium and High Mobilization Rate 
States 1940, 1950, and 1960
1940 1950 1960
Cross-state standard deviations in parenthesis. Data are from Selective Service (1956) monographs and Census 
PUMS one percent samples for 1940, 1950 (sample line subsample), and 1960. State mobilization rate is the 
number of males serving in WWII divided by the number registered ages 18-44 during the draft years. The Census 
PUMS sample includes those ages 14-64 (in earnings year), not living in institutional groups quarters, not employed 
in farming, and residing in the continental United States excluding D.C. and Nevada. There are 16 states in the low 
mobilization category (mobilization rate < 45%: GA, ND, NC, SD, SC, WI, LA, AL, AR, MS, VA, TN, KY, IN, MI, IA,), 
15 states in the medium category (mobilization rate ‡45% and < 49%: MO, TX, NE, MN, MD, DE, VT, IL, FL, NM, 
OH, WV, NY, WY, OK), and 16 states in the high category (mobilization rate ‡ 49%: KS, MT, CT, AZ, CO, NJ, ID, 
CA, ME, WA, PA, UT, NH, OR, RI, MA.)  Earnings samples include workers in paid employment excluding self-
employed who earned between $0.50 and $250 an hour in 1990 dollars during the previous year (deflated by CPI All 
Urban Consumers series CUUR0000SA0) and worked at least 35 hours in the survey reference week and 40 weeks 
in the previous year. Top coded values are imputed as 1.5 times the censored value.  Average years of schooling is 
calculated using highest grade completed. Share non-white and farm are the fraction males in each state ages 13-
44 in 1940 with these characteristics (including farm population).1940 - 90 1970 - 90 1940 - 60 1940 - 50 1940 - 90 1970 - 90 1940 - 60 1940 - 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.008 -0.004 0.016 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 -0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
R
2
0.88 0.70 0.74 0.64 0.89 0.67 0.74 0.58
n 338,322 417,019 152,428 78,094 545,483 694,219 413,793 213,966
1940 - 90 1970 - 90 1940 - 60 1940 - 50 1940 - 90 1970 - 90 1940 - 60 1940 - 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 0.016 -0.017 0.033 0.037
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013) (0.048) (0.012)
R
2
0.83 0.65 0.71 0.55 0.64 0.92 0.63 0.98
n 274,238 376,878 143,031 60,445 94 94 94 94
Weeks Worked 
per Woman
A. Female Weekly Earnings B. Male Weekly Earnings
Weeks Worked 
per Woman
C. Male College/High School Differential D. Male 90-10 Differential
Table 2. OLS Estimates of Impact of Female Labor Supply on Earnings
1940 - 1990 at Various Time Intervals
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Workers
Sample: All Full Time Workers
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Each coefficient in Panels A - 
C is from a pooled microdata regression of the independent variable of interest from the two relevant decades 
regressed on average female weeks worked by state. Additional controls include a quartic in potential experience, a 
year main effect, a constant, and dummies for: non-white, age, marital status, state/country of birth, state of 
residence, and years of completed education.  All individual demographic variables, aside from state of 
residence/birth, are also interacted with a year dummy.  Birthplace dummies correspond to state of birth (if U.S. born) 
or German, Italian, Japanese, Other European, Other Asian, African, Latin American, and Other. Models in Panel C 
are analogous to those in Panels A and B, but are limited to those with exactly a college or high school degree and all 
individual level covariates are additionally interacted with a college graduate dummy. In these specifications, female 
weeks worked is both entered directly and interacted with a college graduate dummy, with the coefficient on the 
interaction reported above. Panel D tabulates separate regressions of estimated state level log 90-10 earnings ratio of 
male full-time weekly earners on weeks worked per female state resident, state dummies, a year dummy, and a 
constant. All education values for years 1940-1970 are coded as highest grade completed. Following the 
recommendations of Jaeger (1997), we define high school graduates in 1990 as those with twelve years of completed 
schooling, a GED, or a high school diploma and we define high school graduates in 1970 as those with exactly 12 
years of completed schooling and no additional uncompleted schooling. Data are drawn from Census PUMS one 
percent samples (1950 sample line subsample) for years 1940-1970 and 1990. 1980 data is drawn from Census 5 
percent sample using a randomly drawn 20 percent subsample. Samples include those ages 14 - 64 in earnings year, 
not living in institutional group quarters, residing in mainland U.S. state excluding Nevada and the District of Columbia 
with non-farm paid employment in survey reference week (excluding self-employed) and positive earnings in previous 
calendar year who earned between $0.50 and $250 an hour in 1990 dollars during the previous year (deflated by CPI 
All Urban Consumers series CUUR0000SA0) and worked at least 35 hours in the survey week and 40 weeks in the 
previous year. Top coded earnings values are imputed as 1.5 times the censored value.   Mean
(sd) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.23 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.25
(0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.10 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.38 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02
(0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
8.89 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.71) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.42 0.22 0.73 -0.36 0.38
(0.03) (0.34) (0.24) (0.24) (0.33)
0.31 0.09 0.38 -0.84 -0.03
(0.01) (0.49) (0.48) (0.53) (0.54)
0.007 -3.15 -1.88 -2.19 -1.16









0.20 0.51 0.40 0.42 0.46 -0.19 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.42 0.94 0.15
(0.34) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.27) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.25) (0.34)
R
2
0.78 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.39 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.70








Table 3. Determinant of State Level WWII Mobilization Rates
















Standard errors are in parenthesis for regression models. Standard deviations are in parentheses for column of means. Columns 1 - 13 
contain regression estimates of state WWII mobilization rates (mean 0.475, standard deviation 0.032) on listed variables. Sample 
includes observations for 47 U.S. states excluding Hawaii, Alaska, Nevada, and the District of Columbia. Regressions are weighted by 
male population ages 13 - 44 in each state from the 1940 Census PUMS. State mobilization rate is the number of males who served in 
WWII divided by the number registered males ages 18-44 during 1940 to 1945 from Selective Service (1956) monographs. The Percent 
Farm, Non-white, Married, and Average Education variables are state averages for these variables for males ages 13 - 44 calculated 
from the 1940 Census PUMS. Percent German, Italian, and Japanese are the fraction of male state residents ages 13-44 born in these 
countries. Percent Fathers is the fraction of women ages 14 - 44 with any children in 1940 (a proxy for paternity). Draft Boards per 
Population is the number of state local draft boards divided by the number of men registered in each state (in thousands) ages 18 - 44 
during 1940 to 1945.  Southern states excluded from column 5 include VA, AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX,KY, MD, OK, TN, WV.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobilization Rate x 1950 13.89 9.59 9.06 10.22 8.28 11.17 10.42 9.85 10.64 8.51
(1.78) (2.38) (2.35) (2.61) (2.39) (1.89) (2.02) (2.05) (2.65) (2.37)
2.04 1.45 1.74 1.04
(1.13) (1.13) (1.08) (1.05)
-2.04 0.70 -1.96 -0.72





0.01 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
n
Age & Marital Status No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth  No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
B. White Females
Table 4. Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on Female Labor Supply 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Annual Weeks Worked
A. All Females
1940 Male Average Years 
of Education x 1950
530,026
1940 Male Fraction 
Farmers x 1950
1940 Male Fraction Non-
white x 1950
585,745
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and year of observation. Each 
column is from a separate pooled 1940 and 1950 microdata regression of weeks worked by female state of 
residence on WWII state mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy, state of residence dummies, a non-
white dummy (where relevant), a year main effect, and a constant. Specifications in columns 2 - 5 also include 
dummies for marital status and years of age. Specifications in columns 3 - 5 contain state/country of birth 
dummies. All individual demographic variables, aside from state of residence/birth, are also interacted with a 
1950 dummy for columns 2-5.  As indicated, models also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, and 
average years of completed schooling among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in women's state of residence (each 
interacted with a 1950 dummy). Data are from Census PUMS one percent samples for 1940 and 1950 (sample 
line sub-sample) and include females ages 14 - 64, not living in institutional group quarters, not in farm 
employment, and residing in mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and District of Columbia. State 
mobilization rate is assigned by female state of residence. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
8.44 8.24 10.90 9.90 8.77 10.61 7.88 10.87 9.06 8.86
(2.35) (2.12) (2.31) (2.43) (2.50) (2.52) (2.41) (2.46) (2.33) (2.29)
2.86 5.82 -5.57 -3.56 0.60 -2.45 -51.81 -12.66 -5.27 0.45
(7.23) (6.92) (3.86) (6.42) (3.89) (2.09) (61.05) (5.71) (4.12) (1.24)
R
2
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
8.11 7.79 5.97 7.78 8.48 8.45 8.30 7.11 8.42 10.56
(2.44) (2.59) (2.47) (2.32) (2.63) (2.30) (2.35) (2.46) (2.62) (2.48)
-2.87 -7.25 -10.26 -15.74 1.14 3.88 -19.08 -13.84 -0.57 2.29
(8.68) (8.49) (5.20) (6.80) (8.02) (2.60) (73.70) (7.52) (3.69) (1.19)
R
2
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
n
Table 5. Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on Female Labor Supply 1940 - 1950
Controlling for the Fraction Males in Occupations in 1940
Dependent Variable: Female Annual Weeks Worked by State










B. Controlling for 1940 Share Farm and Non-White, and Average Years of Education
A. Main specification
Mobilization Rate x 
1950
1940 Male Occ. 
Share x 1950









Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and year of observation. Each column is from a 
separate pooled 1940 and 1950 microdata regression of weeks worked by female state of residence on WWII state 
mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy,  the fraction of males in the listed occupational (industry) category in 1940 
interacted with a 1950 dummy, a year main effect, a constant, and dummies for: non-white (where relevant), age, marital 
status, state of residence, and state/country of birth.  All individual demographic variables, aside from state of 
residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 dummy. Models in panel B also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, 
and average years of completed schooling among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in women's state of residence (each 
interacted with a 1950 dummy.) Data are from Census PUMS one percent samples for 1940 and 1950 (sample line sub-
sample) and include females ages 14 - 64 not living in institutional group quarters, not in farm employment, and residing in 
mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and District of Columbia. State mobilization rate is assigned by female state of 
residence. Occupation and Industry codes correspond to major (1-digit) occupational and industry categories. The defense 
industries correspond to IPUMS 1950 industry codes 326 - 388. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
16.65 13.73 11.38 15.78 13.19 11.42 14.60 -17.47 1.48 10.93 -17.00 -0.04
(6.15) (6.11) (4.42) (5.38) (5.49) (3.97) (13.17) (15.03) (12.82) (12.23) (13.98) (11.94)
3.11 2.61 2.20 2.65 2.19 1.87 3.27 -2.50 0.91 2.66 -2.45 0.65
(1.39) (1.21) (1.07) (1.30) (1.11) (1.01) (1.82) (2.53) (1.66) (1.75) (2.45) (1.65)
0.34 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.66 1.01 0.80 0.65 0.96 0.77
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36)
0.49 0.21 0.56 0.27 0.69 0.41 0.73 0.44
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
-0.04 -0.30 0.04 -0.22 -0.04 -0.23 -0.01 -0.20
(0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
-1.73 -1.36 -1.83 -1.33 -1.96 -1.30 -2.03 -1.30
(0.39) (0.46) (0.39) (0.46) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.41)
P-value: 1
st
 Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n
Dependent Variable: Annual Weeks Worked
A. Females B. Males
Table 6: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates
on Female Labor Supply 1940 - 1950




1940 Male Fraction  
Farmers x 1950
1940 Male Avg. 
Education x 1950
1st Stage Results 1st Stage Results
585,745 530,026
White
1940 Male Fraction 
13-24 x 1950
1940 Male Fraction  
25-34 x 1950
All
Mobilization Rate x 
1950
White
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and year of observation. Each column is 
from a separate pooled 1940 and 1950 microdata 2SLS regression of weeks worked by female state of residence on 
instrumented WWII state mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy, a year main effect, a constant, and 
dummies for: non-white (where relevant), age, marital status, state of residence, and state/country of birth.  All 
individual demographic variables, aside from state of residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 dummy.  
Instruments used in the first stage of these models are the fraction of males ages 13-44 in 1940 who are of German 
birth or who are in the listed age categories (each interacted with a 1950 dummy). Models also control for state 
fraction farmers and average years of completed schooling among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in women's state of 
residence (interacted with a 1950 dummy). Data are from Census PUMS one percent samples for 1940 and 1950 
(sample line sub-sample) and include those ages 14 - 64, not living in institutional group quarters, not in farm 
employment, and residing in mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and District of Columbia. State mobilization rate 
is assigned by state of residence. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9.06 8.28 12.21 6.54 9.85 8.51 11.28 6.34
(2.35) (2.39) (2.98) (2.31) (2.05) (2.37) (2.97) (2.40)
R
2
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20
0.019 0.184 0.282 0.148 0.063 0.174 0.253 0.130
(0.076) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) (0.069) (0.071) (0.080) (0.081)
R
2
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20
n 585,745     585,745     585,745     410,794     530,026      530,026     530,026     393,820    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-3.85 2.70 0.09 3.66 -7.25 2.15 0.39 3.56
(1.95) (2.15) (2.43) (2.11) (1.81) (1.95) (2.23) (1.86)
R
2
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17
0.044 -0.009 -0.017 0.032 -0.057 -0.006 0.002 0.035
(0.054) (0.069) (0.071) (0.073) (0.049) (0.067) (0.064) (0.069)
R
2
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
n 683,976     683,976     683,976     480,545     615,590      615,590     615,590     449,275    
 Region x 1950 No No Yes No No No Yes No






Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Fraction Farm / 
Non-white/ Avg Ed 




B. 1950 - 1960
All White
Coefficient on Mobilization Rate Variable x 1960
Coefficient on Mobilization Rate Variable x 1950
Table 7. Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on Female Labor Supply
1940 - 1950 and 1950 - 1960
Dependent Variable: Female Weeks Worked
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and year of observation. Each column is from a 
separate pooled 1940 - 1950 or 1950 - 1960 microdata regression of individual weeks worked on WWII state mobilization 
rate interacted with a 1950 or 1960 dummy (in Panels A and B respectively), a year main effect, a constant, and dummies 
for: non-white (where relevant), marital status, age, state of residence, and state/country of birth.  All individual 
demographic variables, aside from state of residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 or 1960 dummy.  As indicated, 
models also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, and average education among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in 
women's state of residence (each interacted with a 1950 dummy.)  State mobilization rate is assigned by female state of 
residence. Data are from Census PUMS one percent samples for 1940, 1950 (sample line sub-sample) and 1960, and 
include females ages 14 - 64, not living in institutional group quarters, not in farm employment, and residing in mainland 
U.S. state excluding Nevada and District of Columbia. Weeks worked for 1960 is calculated using the midpoint of the 
intervalled weeks worked. Any weeks worked is defined as weeks worked greater than zero. Region x 1950 dummies refer 
to 4 main Census geographic regions. Southern states excluded from columns 4 and 8 are VA, AL, AR, FL, MS, NC, SC, 
TX, KY, MD, OK, TN, and WV.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mobilization Rate x 1950 4.09 5.33 5.09 -5.50 -5.41 7.79 -2.82 0.53 -10.63
(5.96) (5.63) (5.69) (7.56) (8.01) (6.51) (9.27) (5.40) (7.35)
2.30 2.33 2.50 2.40
(1.34) (1.47) (1.88) (1.35)
-9.15 -9.32 -10.59 -7.52





0.02 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.34
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mobilization Rate x 1950 0.46 4.09 3.60 -6.56 -6.56 7.37 -4.15 -4.03 -10.84
(5.98) (5.34) (5.43) (7.12) (7.59) (6.46) (9.02) (4.71) (6.64)
1.97 1.97 1.97 2.74
(1.27) (1.41) (1.86) (1.39)
-9.11 -9.11 -10.56 -6.50





0.02 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35
n
Age & Marital Status No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes








1940 Male Avg Years of 
Schooling x 1950
479,867
Table 8.  Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on Male Labor Supply 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Annual Weeks Worked
A. All Males
Non-Vets Vets All
1940 Male Fraction Non-
white x 1950
Non-Vets Vets
1940 Male Fraction 
Farmers x 1950
397,338
1940 Male Avg Years of 
Schooling x 1950
B. White Males
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and year of observation. Each 
column is from a separate pooled 1940 - 1950 microdata regression of individual weeks worked on WWII 
state mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy, a year main effect, a constant, and dummies for non-
white (where relevant) and state of residence. Specifications in columns 2 - 5 add dummies for married and 
age.  Specifications in columns 3 - 5 add state/country of birth dummies. Columns 6 - 9 include all 1940 
males and only WWII Veterans or Non-Veterans in 1950 as noted.  All individual demographic variables, 
aside from state of residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 dummy for columns 2-9.  As indicated, 
models also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, and average education among males ages 13 - 
44 in 1940 in male's state of residence (each interacted with a 1950 dummy). State mobilization rate is 
assigned by male state of residence. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.107 -0.103 -0.103 -0.068 -0.062 -0.060 -0.061 -0.023 -0.046 -0.025 -0.087 -0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
13.21 13.03 13.02 9.35 13.36 13.11 13.10 9.76 13.08 9.72 13.45 10.16
(1.61) (2.39) (2.39) (2.70) (1.80) (2.37) (2.37) (2.67) (2.36) (2.65) (2.52) (2.81)
OLS -Weeks Worked per Woman -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.015 0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.124 -0.108 -0.108 -0.072 -0.080 -0.070 -0.071 -0.021 -0.052 -0.024 -0.102 -0.014
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
10.22 11.70 11.68 11.20 10.23 11.66 11.65 11.44 11.70 11.42 11.82 11.74
(1.81) (2.15) (2.14) (2.72) (1.90) (2.17) (2.16) (2.73) (2.17) (2.72) (2.26) (2.82)
OLS -Weeks Worked per Woman -0.004 -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.016 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)
n
Female Age Structure No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction Farm/Non-white/Avg Ed No No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
162,484
1st Stage Coefficient
(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
69,335 198,385 178,163
174,494
B. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: Whites
Females Males Male Non-Vets Male Veterans
1st Stage Coefficient
(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
78,094 213,966 192,256
Table 9. IV Specifications: Impact of Female Labor Supply on Female and Male Earnings 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings
A. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: All
Females Males Male Non-Vets Male Veterans
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Each column is from a separate pooled 1940 - 1950 microdata 
regression of log weekly earnings on weeks worked per female by state of residence.  All regressions control for state of residence, a year main effect, 
education, a quartic in potential experience, a constant, and dummies for non-white (where relevant), marital status, and WWII Veteran (for males). All 
individual demographic variables, aside from state of residence/birth, are interacted with a 1950 dummy. All columns except 1 and 5 control for female age 
structure (the first two age categories in five year increments, the remaining four in ten year increments over age range 14 - 64).  As indicated, models 
control for state/country of birth and fraction farmers, non-whites, and average education of males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 by state of residence (each 
interacted with a 1950 dummy). Columns 9 - 12 contain all males in 1940 and only WWII Veterans or WWII non-Veterans in 1950 as noted. Weeks worked 
per woman is calculated for all non-farm female state residents ages 14 - 64. In OLS regressions, this variable is treated as exogenous. In IV regressions, it 
is instrumented by state WWII mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy variable. All individual and aggregate controls are included in first stage 
models. The first stage coefficient and standard error on the mobilization rate variable are given below the regression. Data are from Census PUMS one 
percent samples (1950 limited to sample line observations) and include those ages 14 - 64, in paid non-farm employment in survey reference week 
(excluding self-employed), with positive earnings in previous calendar year, who earned between $0.50 and $250 an hour in 1990 dollars (deflated by CPI All 
Urban Consumers series CUUR0000SA0), who worked at least 35 hours in the survey week and 40 weeks in the previous year, did not live in institutional 
group quarters, and resided in mainland U.S. states excluding Nevada and the District of Columbia. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(LSFemale/LSMale) -0.390 -0.386 -0.391 -0.226 -0.471 -0.440 -0.446 -0.197
(0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.190) (0.098) (0.092) (0.095) (0.165)
-0.328 -0.278 -0.272 -0.354 -0.432 -0.332 -0.324 -0.309
(0.115) (0.105) (0.099) (0.182) (0.157) (0.126) (0.119) (0.161)
2.05 2.03 2.03 1.09 1.67 1.77 1.77 1.24
(0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29)
Implied Female Demand sF -1.39 -1.51 -1.51 -1.73 -1.11 -1.30 -1.30 -1.98
Implied M/F Substition sM/F -3.05 -3.60 -3.68 -2.83 -2.32 -3.02 -3.08 -3.24
p-value of H0: (sF)
-1
 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(LSFemale/LSMale) -0.513 -0.463 -0.469 -0.254 -0.527 -0.473 -0.480 -0.237
(0.107) (0.089) (0.092) (0.200) (0.113) (0.096) (0.099) (0.185)
-0.315 -0.264 -0.254 -0.421 -0.331 -0.277 -0.266 -0.380
(0.126) (0.117) (0.116) (0.191) (0.139) (0.124) (0.122) (0.170)
1.56 1.75 1.75 1.14 1.51 1.70 1.70 1.22
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.30) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.34)
Implied Female Demand sF -1.21 -1.38 -1.38 -1.48 -1.17 -1.33 -1.34 -1.62
Implied M/F Substition sM/F -3.18 -3.78 -3.94 -2.37 -3.02 -3.61 -3.76 -2.63
p-value of H0: (sF)
-1
 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
n
Female Age Structure No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Farm/Non-white/Avg Ed No No No Yes No No No Yes
Table 10. Impact of Female Labor Supply on Female/Male Earnings Differential 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings








B. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: White
1st Stage Coefficient









(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Each column is from a separate 
pooled 1940 - 1950 microdata regression of log weekly male and female earnings on the log ratio of female to male non-
farm labor supply measured in weeks (columns 1-4) or efficiency units (columns 5 - 8).  All models include controls for 
veteran status, nonwhite, marital status, education, a quartic in potential experience, (each interacted with a female 
dummy and a 1950 dummy), state of residence, and a year main effect.  As indicated, models control for state female age 
structure and state/country of birth, and state fraction farmers, non-whites, and average education among males ages 13 - 
44 in 1940 (each interacted with a 1950 dummy.)  All variables are interacted with a female dummy. Log of (female/male) 
labor supply measure is calculated for all non-farm state residents ages 14 - 64. This measure and its interaction with a 
female dummy are instrumented by state WWII mobilization rate and its interaction with a female dummy. The first stage 
coefficient on the mobilization rate main effect is tabulated below each regression. All individual and aggregate controls 
are included in first stage models. See text for details of the efficiency unit measure used in columns 5 - 8. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(LSFemale/LSMale) -0.382 -0.424 -0.267 -0.401 -0.265 -0.471 -0.466 -0.269 -0.428 -0.270
(0.096) (0.101) (0.225) (0.115) (0.229) (0.126) (0.118) (0.228) (0.141) (0.228)
ln(LSFemale/Male) x College 0.139 0.154 0.162 0.189 0.175 0.206 0.261 0.233 0.283 0.231
(0.097) (0.114) (0.222) (0.119) (0.215) (0.126) (0.117) (0.210) (0.131) (0.210)
-0.098 -0.069 -0.042 -0.004
(0.094) (0.086) (0.087) (0.080)
2.06 2.04 1.12 1.94 1.11 1.62 1.79 1.18 1.64 1.19
(0.21) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30)
0.64 0.64 0.39 0.53 0.34 0.56 0.44 0.14 0.34 0.15
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(LSFemale/LSMale) -0.170 -0.205 -0.074 -0.162 -0.098 -0.192 -0.220 -0.115 -0.173 -0.129
(0.088) (0.088) (0.194) (0.139) (0.196) (0.109) (0.107) (0.205) (0.149) (0.203)
-0.212 -0.219 -0.194 -0.181 -0.161 -0.279 -0.246 -0.154 -0.153 -0.140
(0.070) (0.086) (0.184) (0.119) (0.179) (0.097) (0.095) (0.178) (0.117) (0.173)
-0.036 -0.104 -0.070 -0.145
(0.064) (0.065) (0.057) (0.072)
1.99 2.01 1.14 1.54 1.13 1.64 1.80 1.20 1.56 1.20
(0.21) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.30) (0.26) (0.30)
2.24 2.07 3.63 2.12 2.63 2.45 2.12 2.34 1.89 2.09
n
p-value of H0: DWHS = 0 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.24
Female Age  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth State, Married,  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Farm/Non-white/ Avg Ed No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
60,445 58,885
B. High School Graduate/8th Grade Log Weekly Earnings Differential
All Males
Table 11. Impact of Female Labor Supply on Male Educational Earnings Differentials 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings
A. Male College / High School Graduate Log Weekly Earnings Differential










LS8th-Male) x High School
1st Stage Coefficient




ln(LSFemale/Male) x High 
School
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Samples and specifications are 
analogous to Table 10 except: sample in Panel A is restricted to males with exactly a college or high school degree; sample 
in Panel B is restricted to males with exactly a high school degree or 8th grade completion; in addition to time interactions on 
all individual level controls, all variables are interacted with college graduate dummy in Panel A and high school graduate 
dummy in Panel B. Log (female/male) labor supply measured in weeks and its interaction with college or high school dummy 
and a 1950 dummy are instrumented by state mobilization rate and its interaction with college or high school dummy. All 
individual and aggregate controls are included in first stage of IV models. Mean D (1) Mean D (1) (1) (2) (1) (2) Mean D (1) Mean D (1)
D 90-10 -0.336 0.548 -0.316 0.359 0.311 0.502 0.456 0.470 -0.399 1.398 -0.335 0.456
(0.011) (0.156) (0.008) (0.171) (0.103) (0.278) (0.123) (0.282) (0.020) (0.225) (0.011) (0.234)
D 90-50 -0.170 0.596 -0.156 0.455 0.230 0.259 0.346 0.205 -0.188 0.489 -0.182 0.251
(0.010) (0.122) (0.007) (0.147) (0.081) (0.220) (0.098) (0.220) (0.010) (0.112) (0.008) (0.155)
D 50-10 -0.166 -0.048 -0.160 -0.096 0.081 0.243 0.109 0.265 -0.210 0.910 -0.152 0.205
(0.009) (0.129) (0.008) (0.178) (0.086) (0.211) (0.096) (0.204) (0.015) (0.202) (0.013) (0.274)
D 80-20 -0.222 0.447 -0.216 0.550 0.250 0.295 0.378 0.210 -0.262 0.648 -0.227 0.180
(0.010) (0.123) (0.008) (0.147) (0.071) (0.194) (0.094) (0.219) (0.012) (0.141) (0.007) (0.130)
D 80-50 -0.117 0.425 -0.106 0.340 0.171 0.125 0.256 0.054 -0.137 0.195 -0.134 0.114
(0.009) (0.104) (0.007) (0.138) (0.057) (0.158) (0.075) (0.174) (0.008) (0.104) (0.007) (0.148)
D 50-20 -0.105 0.022 -0.110 0.210 0.079 0.170 0.122 0.156 -0.125 0.454 -0.093 0.066
(0.008) (0.120) (0.006) (0.115) (0.055) (0.132) (0.070) (0.147) (0.009) (0.119) (0.008) (0.167)
n/a No n/a No No Yes No Yes n/a No n/a No
Table 12. IV Estimates: Impact of Female Labor Supply on Overall and Residual Earnings Inequality 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Change in State Level Estimated Log Earnings Differentials
Coefficient on ln(LSFemale/LSMale)





All Whites All Whites
n = 94 in each model: 47 states x two years. Standard errors in parentheses. Each coefficient is from a separate 2SLS regression of the state level 
1940 - 1950 change in the log ratio of overall or residual male weekly full time earnings at the specified percentiles on contemporaneous state level 
change in log(female/male) labor supply measured in weeks instrumented by the state mobilization rate (interacted with a 1950 dummy). All models 
include state of residence dummies, a 1950 dummy, and a constant. Overall inequality in column 1 is calculated using samples in Table 9 from a 
regression of male log weekly full-time earnings on year and state of residence dummies. Regression used to calculate residuals for column 2 
additionally controls fo: a quartic in potential experience, education, non-white, state of residence, state/country of birth, veteran status, marital 
status, and state female age structure by year. All individual level controls in residualizing regressions, except for state of birth/residence, are 
interacted with a 1950 dummy.  The regression for column 2 of Panel B adds fraction farmers, non-white, and average years of completed schooling 
for male state residents 13 - 44 in 1940 (each interacted with a 1950 dummy.)  Both the endogenous and instrumental variables in the above 
regressions are orthogonalized with respect to the microdata variables.(1) (2) (3) (4)
8.72 11.24 9.25 10.82
(2.29) (3.02) (1.83) (3.16)
0.002 0.274 0.033 0.251
(0.065) (0.078) (0.053) (0.082)
n
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1.77 1.14 0.96 1.64
(0.64) (0.88) (0.71) (0.94)
1.35 1.33 1.04 1.70
(0.62) (0.88) (0.67) (0.91)
n
(1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.54 0.11 -0.73 0.42
(0.59) (0.72) (0.62) (0.72)
-0.49 0.21 -0.57 0.41
(0.57) (0.71) (0.59) (0.70)
n
Appendix Table 1. Alternative Estimates of Impact of World War II Mobilization 
Rates on Decadal Changes in State Labor Supply, 1940 - 1950.
Coefficient on Mobilization Rate x 1950 Variable Tabulated in Each Panel
Yes
Weeks worked in previous year 
Positive weeks in previous year 
524,634 470,326
Fraction Farmer/Non-white/Avg Ed No Yes No
94
A. Dependent Variable: Weeks Worked Per Woman: Mobilization Rate Assigned by 
State of Birth










Notes for Panel A. Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of 
residence and year of observation. Each column is from a separate pooled 1940 - 1950 
microdata regression of weeks worked by female state residents on WWII state 
mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy, a year main effect, a constant, and 
dummies for: non-white (where relevant), age, marital status, state of residence, and 
state/country of birth. All individual demographic variables, aside from state of 
residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 dummy. State mobilization rate is assigned 
by female state of birth. As indicated, models also control for state fraction farmers, non-
white, and average education among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in state of birth (each 
interacted with a 1950 dummy.) 
Notes for Panels B and C. Each coefficient is from a separate regression of log total state 
labor supply in weeks or efficiency units by gender and year on the state mobilization rate 
(interacted with a 1950 dummy), state dummies, a year main effect, and a constant.  
Regressions are weighted by state-gender population ages 18-64 in each year. As 
indicated, models also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, and average education 
among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in state of residence (each interacted with a 1950 
dummy.)(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 14 - 64 9.06 8.28 9.85 8.73
(2.35) (2.39) (2.05) (2.39)
Ages 14 - 17 1.38 1.20 1.41 0.88
(0.35) (0.42) (0.32) (0.39)
Ages 18 - 24 2.35 4.85 2.24 5.06
(0.94) (1.19) (0.99) (1.32)
Ages 25 - 34 1.26 2.16 0.57 2.00
(0.95) (1.55) (0.88) (1.58)
Ages 35 - 44 1.89 2.32 2.41 2.31
(0.72) (0.93) (0.73) (0.93)
Ages 45 - 54 1.54 -2.10 2.23 -1.44
(1.10) (1.56) (1.05) (1.55)
Ages 55 - 64 0.65 -0.15 1.00 -0.08
(0.99) (1.08) (0.96) (1.05)
8th Grade and Below -2.27 -0.79 -1.05 -0.82
(1.97) (1.78) (1.47) (1.76)
-2.44 1.93 -2.75 1.75
(1.53) (1.56) (1.51) (1.49)
12th Grade and Above 13.78 7.13 13.65 7.81
(1.77) (1.79) (1.85) (2.02)
n 585,745 530,026
9th Grade to 11th 
Grade
Yes Fraction Farm, Non-
white, Avg Ed
No Yes No
A. Weeks Worked by Age Group
B. Weeks Worked by Education Group
Appendix Table 2. Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on Female 
Labor Supply by Age and Education: 1940 - 1950.
Dependent Variable: Annual Weeks Worked
Coefficient on Mobilization Rate Variable x 1950
All Females White Females
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and 
year of observation. Each entry is from a separate pooled microdata 
regression for the relevant demographic subgroup of female weeks worked by 
state of residence on state mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy,  a 
year main effect, a constant, and dummies for non-white (where relevant), 
age, marital status, state of residence, and state/country of birth. All individual 
demographic variables, aside from state of residence/birth, are also interacted 
with a 1950 dummy. As indicated, models also control for state fraction 
farmers, non-white, and average education among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 
in women's state of residence (each interacted with a 1950 dummy).  
Education categories reflect the highest grade completed. Cohorts
Ages 14 - 24 (1940) 6.11 19.02 4.16 18.14
Ages 24 - 34 (1950) (5.24) (5.48) (5.25) (5.71)
n
Ages 25 - 34 (1940) -3.52 16.84 -2.33 16.21
Ages 35 - 44 (1950) (4.04) (6.14) (3.55) (6.53)
n
Ages 35 - 44 (1940) 21.16 15.19 23.42 17.76
Ages 45 - 54 (1950) (5.39) (7.38) (5.40) (7.23)
n
Ages 45 - 54 (1940) 11.56 -8.19 13.91 -6.45
Ages 55 - 64 (1950) (5.82) (5.22) (5.46) (4.75)
n
155,272 138,870
Appendix Table 3. Impact of World War II Mobilization Rates on 
Female Labor Supply by Cohort: 1940 - 1950.
Dependent Variable: Annual Weeks Worked





Yes Fraction Farm, Non-
white, Avg Ed
No Yes No
Standard errors in parenthesis account for clustering on state of residence and 
year of observation. Each entry is from a separate pooled 1940 - 1950 microdata 
regression of individual weeks worked by females from the listed cohort on state 
mobilization rate interacted with a 1950 dummy,  a year main effect, a constant, 
and dummies for: non-white (where relevant), age, marital status, state of 
residence, and state/country of birth. All individual demographic variables, aside 
from state of residence/birth, are also interacted with a 1950 dummy.  As indicated, 
models also control for state fraction farmers, non-white, and average education 
among males ages 13 - 44 in 1940 in female's state of residence (each interacted 
with a 1950 dummy). Mobilization rate is assigned by female state of residence. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.103 -0.068 -0.041 0.018 -0.158 -0.145 -0.061 -0.023 -0.030 0.012 -0.064 -0.032
(0.023) (0.041) (0.021) (0.022) (0.035) (0.075) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023)
13.02 9.35 14.70 14.05 11.22 7.21 13.10 9.76 15.34 14.07 11.19 7.65
(2.39) (2.70) (4.15) (3.76) (1.96) (3.00) (2.37) (2.67) (4.01) (3.97) (1.93) (2.80)
OLS -Weeks Worked per Woman -0.007 0.007 0.000 0.010 -0.035 0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.014 0.006
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.108 -0.072 -0.018 0.001 -0.155 -0.135 -0.071 -0.021 -0.024 0.014 -0.063 -0.031
(0.025) (0.038) (0.028) (0.022) (0.033) (0.071) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
11.68 11.20 11.84 15.05 11.64 8.04 11.65 11.44 11.76 14.46 11.41 8.28
(2.14) (2.72) (3.80) (4.03) (1.99) (3.08) (2.16) (2.73) (3.81) (4.08) (1.99) (2.86)
OLS -Weeks Worked per Woman -0.012 -0.001 0.008 0.008 -0.033 0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.016 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
n
Fraction Farm/Non-white/Avg Ed No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region x 1950 Dummies No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No






(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
1st Stage Coefficient
(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
B. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: Whites
58,727 161,683
Appendix Table 4. IV Specifications: Impact of Female Labor Supply on Female and Male Earnings 1940 - 1950:
Dropping the South and Adding 4 Region x 1950 Dummies
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings
A. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: All
Females Males
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Samples and specifications are identical to Table 9 columns 3 
and 4 (females) and columns 7 and 8 (males) except as noted for addition of 4 Census main geographic dummies (interacted with a 1950 dummy) and 
dropping of the Southern region in columns 5, 6, 11 and 12 (VA, AL, AR, FL, MS, NC, SC, TX, KY, MD, OK, TN, and WV).  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.095 -0.078 -0.078 -0.131 -0.068 -0.051 -0.052 -0.029
(0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.049) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.033 -0.085 -0.084 -0.402 0.025 -0.048 -0.046 -0.062
(1940 State Mean Log Wage x 1950) (0.084) (0.063) (0.062) (0.153) (0.073) (0.059) (0.060) (0.071)
9.40 10.24 10.23 8.87 7.82 9.38 9.37 11.85
(2.07) (2.59) (2.59) (2.74) (2.08) (2.29) (2.29) (3.19)
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV - Weeks Worked per Woman -0.070 -0.057 -0.057 -0.097 -0.060 -0.047 -0.049 -0.029
(0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.284 -0.275 -0.277 -0.360 -0.102 -0.148 -0.143 -0.093
(1940 State Mean Log Wage x 1950) (0.074) (0.052) (0.053) (0.113) (0.063) (0.048) (0.051) (0.077)
10.22 11.73 11.71 11.10 8.90 10.78 10.77 12.88
(1.64) (2.49) (2.49) (2.60) (1.84) (2.21) (2.21) (3.22)
n
Female Age Structure No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fraction Farm/Non-white/Avg Ed No No No Yes No No No Yes
Appendix Table 5. Lagged Dependent Variable IV Specifications: Impact of Female Labor Supply on 
Female and Male Earnings 1940 - 1950
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Earnings
A. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: All
Females Males
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Each column is from a separate 
pooled 1940 - 1950 microdata regression of log weekly earnings on weeks worked per female by state of residence 
instrumented by state mobilization rate (interacted with 1950 dummy).  The lagged dependent variable is equal to the 
1940 state mean log weekly full-time wage for the relevant gender/race group interacted with a 1950 dummy. 
Specifications and control variables are otherwise identical to Table 9.
1st Stage Coefficient
(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
78,094 213,966
B. Full-Time Weekly Earnings: Whites
Females Males
1st Stage Coefficient
(Mobilization Rate x 1950)
69,335 198,385(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(LSFemale/LSMale) -0.385 -0.579 -0.583 20.1 -0.707 -0.837 -0.845 -1.410
(0.089) (0.168) (0.171) (311.8) (0.194) (0.259) (0.267) (1.265)
-0.039 -0.028 -0.014 13.0 0.094 0.138 0.156 -1.733
(0.105) (0.122) (0.114) (291.5) (0.171) (0.200) (0.191) (4.184)
2.10 1.77 1.77 -0.03 1.17 1.06 1.06 0.24
(0.39) (0.47) (0.47) (0.42) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.40)
Implied Female Demand sF -2.36 -1.65 -1.68 0.03 -1.63 -1.43 -1.45 -0.32
Implied M/F Substition sM/F -25.48 -36.36 -69.99 n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.58
p-value of H0: (sF)
-1
 = 0 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.96 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.55
n
Female Age Structure No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State of Birth No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Farm/Non-white/Avg Ed No No No Yes No No No Yes
Appendix Table 6. IV Estimated Impact of Female Labor Supply on Female/Male Earnings 
Differential 1940 - 1960
Dependent Variable: Full-Time Log Weekly Earnings





(Mobilization Rate x 1960)
Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering on state and year of observation. Each column is 
from a separate pooled 1940 and 1960 microdata regression of log weekly male and female earnings on 
the log ratio of female to male non-farm labor supply in weeks instrumented by the state mobilization rate 
interacted with a 1960 dummy. Sample definition and specifications are identical to Table 10 columns 1 - 4 
except that 1960 Census data is used in place of 1950 Census data.Figure 1. Labor Force Participation by Gender of U.S. Residents Ages 16 - 65, 1890 - 1990. 














































sFigure 2. Male and Female Labor Force Participation

























































































































































































)Figure 3. State WWII Mobilization Rates and Female Labor Supply, 1940 - 1960
Coef = 5.23  se = 7.65  t = 0.68
Mobilization Rate and Mean Female Weeks Worked in 1940
















































Coef = 15.41  se = 3.34  t = 4.62
Mobilization Rate and Change in Female Weeks Worked 1940-50




















































Coef = -4.75  se = 2.42  t = -1.97
Mobilization Rate and Change in Female Weeks Worked 1950-60





















































A. 1940 Cross section
B. 1940 - 1950 Change
C. 1950 - 1960 ChangeFigure 4. State WWII Mobilization Rates and Changes in Male and Female Mean Log Weekly 
Wages, 1940 - 1950
Mobilization Rate and Log Female Wage Change 1940-50
 Delta log weekly wages  Fitted values














































Mobilization Rate and Log Male Wage Change 1940-50
 Delta log weekly wages  Fitted values








































B. MalesFigure 5. State WWII Mobilization Rates and Changes in Male and Female Mean Log Weekly 
Wages, 1940 - 1950
Mobilization Rate and Log Female Wage Change 1950-60
 Delta log weekly wages  Fitted values






































WY CA OR WA
Mobilization Rate and Log Male Wage Change 1950-60
 Delta log weekly wages  Fitted values




































B. MalesFigure 6. Estimated Impact of State WWII Mobilization Rate on Standardized Quarters Worked Annually by 










1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975
Coefficient on Mobilization Measure 90 Percent Confidence Interval